Fired Up: Scales of Safety and Federal Wildland Fire Management in the U.S. by Lobby, Samuel Younger





Submitted to the graduate degree programs in Urban Planning and Geography and the Graduate 
Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts. 
 
 
________________________________        
    Chairperson Dr. Shannon O’Lear             
 
________________________________        
Co-Chair Dr. Ward Lyles 
________________________________        













The Thesis Committee for Samuel Lobby 













      ________________________________ 
 Chairperson Dr. Shannon O’Lear 
 
 
      ________________________________ 












       







The wildland fire environment in the U.S. is becoming increasingly complex due to a century of 
fire suppression policies, development in wildland-urban interface areas, and an expected 
increase in fire activity due to climate change. As more attention is focused on wildfire 
management, the role of U.S. federal wildland firefighters is quickly changing. Unlike most 
structure fire departments, federal wildland firefighters do not have a standardized "medic" 
position on crews and are provided very little medical training, leaving them particularly 
vulnerable to medical emergencies when responding to remote incidents. The history of 
firefighter safety policy creation is marked by reactions to visceral accidents, yet there are 
examples of more proactive approaches to safety policy creation within individual agencies. This 
research explores injury rates at various scales, particularly smaller incidents (Types 4-5), 
prescribed fires, and daily project work where planning for medical emergencies is more 
difficult. A detailed policy analysis using a "Science and Technology Studies" (STS) framework 
will attempt to uncover how firefighter safety knowledge is produced and operationalized, what 
size fires these policies apply to, and at which levels of organizational management these 
policies are implemented. As a former Forest Service firefighter, I intend to investigate major 
safety issues faced by federal firefighters with the goal of producing research that will increase 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Hundreds evacuated as wildfire spreads.” “Deadly fires rip across American West.” 
“Record breaking fire season.” These types of headlines are becoming increasingly frequent, and 
many physical geographers are predicting wildfire seasons of the future will burn hotter and 
consume more forest land (Tang, et al., 2014). Though wildfire is a natural part of ecological 
systems in the American West, several anthropogenic factors are exacerbating the effects 
wildfire has on both the landscape and on human populations in these regions. A century of 
federal fire suppression policies in the Western United States have led to the accumulation of 
hazardous fuels by excluding fire from environments where it would otherwise naturally occur 
(Pyne, 2015). As a result of these historical suppression policies, developers were allowed to 
expand housing subdivisions into the “Wildland-Urban Interface” (WUI), an area where human 
populations establish in rural areas that may be prone to wildfire (Bradshaw and Lueck, 2012). 
What’s more, human-caused climate change is also exacerbating fire weather conditions which 
are conducive to large fire growth (Pyne, 2015). With the perfect alignment of social and 
ecological factors, the wildfire environment will become predictably unpredictable – and with 
that, it will present significantly more safety hazards to federal wildland firefighters working on 
the front lines. 
Project Scope 
 My project focuses on wildland firefighters working for the federal government and the 
safety hazards they face on the fireline. The five federal land management agencies that are 
tasked with managing wildfire incidents work under the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) or the Department of the Interior (DOI) and are: The U.S. Forest Service (USDA), the 
Bureau of Land Management (DOI), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (DOI), the National Park 
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Service (DOI), and the Fish and Wildlife Service (DOI). In order to protect their employees, 
these agencies have created a framework of safety policies over time that is designed to address 
situations firefighters may encounter in the field. Federal firefighter safety policies can focus on 
a range of hazards that can be related to the fire itself or medical emergencies that occur while 
engaged with a wildfire. One of the most significant shortcomings that exist within federal 
wildland fire management in regards to employee safety is the lack of emergency medical 
training. Unlike many structure firefighters working for municipal departments who receive 
extensive training to become qualified as Emergency Medical Providers, the standard of medical 
training provided to wildland firefighters working for the federal government is only a 16-hour 
First Aid/CPR class. Because wildland firefighters are often tasked with managing fires in 
remote areas far from medical support, they are particularly vulnerable if a medical emergency 
occurs, whether it be a minor injury such as a sprained ankle or painful big bite to more severe 
medical emergencies such as a chainsaw injury, broken bones, or serious life-threatening 
emergencies. With these issues in mind in mind, my investigation will consider how safety 
policy is applied to either large or small size wildfire incidents, and how various approaches to 
safety policy production occur at different levels of organizational management within the 
federal wildland fire service.  
Research Context 
Chapter 2 discusses relevant literature related to natural hazard mitigation, Science and 
Technology Studies (STS), and the social construction of scale. Because wildland fire 
management can be considered a policy domain prone to disaster, planning and policy 
implementation for natural disasters will be a salient theme throughout this project. Referring to 
natural hazards mitigation literature, I discuss two common approaches to policy production 
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within policy domains prone to disaster. Reactive approaches are characterized as being a form 
of “political learning” where an outside perturbation is needed to stimulate an organization to 
respond and proactive approaches are characterized as being a form of “social learning,” where 
an organization proactively searches for weaknesses rather than waiting for them to occur before 
devising a response (Birkland, 2006). Though these are not the only possible ways of creating 
policies, these approaches are evident within the field of wildland fire management. These two 
approaches to policy production can be evaluated using one specific insight developed within the 
broader field of Science and Technology Studies that considers how scientific knowledge is 
produced, applied to specific policies, and circulated over space to address an issue (Goldman, 
2013).  
Once these policies are operationalized, they may be applied to wildfire incidents that 
range in size from small to large, and will be managed by different levels of organizational 
governance. Geographic literature on the social construction of scale will be useful in this 
context as scale is commonly used as a means of characterizing issues in reference to their size 
and geographic extent, or in reference to levels of organizational management. When 
characterizing scales of a natural hazard in reference to its size or geographic extent, it is 
possible for these socially constructed designations of scale to have material impacts on those 
operating at either large or small scales of incident management. Additionally, when considering 
scale as a reference to levels of organizational management, this project will consider how 
reactive and proactive approaches are being used at different scales of governance – where the 
reactive approach that has traditionally characterized the evolution of safety policy and has set 
the standard for how policy reforms occur for all firefighters working for the federal fire service, 
the proactive approaches are occurring within the federal fire service at the scale of individual 
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agencies or regions within agencies but is not applied to all firefighters working for the federal 
government. Considering which operational scales employ specific approaches to policy 
production can help to reveal how socially constructed levels of governance can have political 
consequences which impact those on the ground in specific spaces.  
Background 
After discussing the Research Context, I will cover background information on wildland 
fire management that will be useful to address my investigation of firefighter safety policy. First, 
I will discuss the way in which the five federal land management agencies define space and the 
levels of organization ranging from the fire service scale in which all agencies are involved to the 
individual agency scales, or regions within agencies. Next, I will discuss how these agencies 
administratively designate wildfire incidents as either “large” or “small” scale. Incident scales 
are an important political designation because it directly relates to the number of resources that 
will be present at the scene of a wildfire and the responses incident command staff can take to 
address increasing fire activity, medical emergencies, or other management concerns.  
Following the discussion of how scale is operationalized in references to different size 
fires and different levels of organizational management, I will discuss how firefighter safety 
policy has evolved historically in the United States, showing that the most impactful events to 
transform safety policy were worst-case-scenario events that occurred on large scale fires. The 
first firefighter safety policies came about in response to fire related hazards, such as fires that 
blew out of control and killed firefighters. The last example discussed is in reference to a 
medical emergency that occurred on a fire that was not a result of a fire related injury. This 
incident led to the first major safety policy that addressed emergency medical response. While it 
may be a surprise that there is a lack of medical training in the federal wildland fire service, there 
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are many legal and jurisdictional factors that make this so. The last section of the Background 
Chapter will discuss the factors that inhibit medical training. 
Methodology 
My Methods chapter which is based on a policy analysis I use to answer my research 
question: How are reactive and proactive approaches to federal wildland firefighter safety policy 
creation produced, applied, and circulated to address safety issues related to emergency medical 
response on both large and small size wildfires and at different levels of organizational 
management? To address my research question, I will use the template provided by Bardach in 
his book The Eight-Step Path of Policy Analysis (1996) where he lays out a systematic approach 
to analyzing policy documents. The policy documents will be in reference to four historical 
events that reflected a reactive approach to policy production: The Fires of 1910, The Mann 
Gulch Fire of 1949, the South Canyon Fire of 1994, and the Eagle Fire of 2008.  
Other policy documents will be used that demonstrate how policy production can be 
proactively approached, and include the examples of: The Forest Service Region 4 6725 
Emergency Medical Services Guidelines 6725, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs Wildland Fire 
First Aid Project. The proactive and reactive approaches will be evaluated using criteria 
borrowed from Goldman’s STS approach to analyzing policy (Goldman, 2011), which includes 
investigating how scientific knowledge was produced following an opportunity for 
organizational leaning, how this knowledge was applied to specific policies designed to address 
a problem, and how these policies were circulated over space to affected individuals. In short, 
the criteria of production, application, and circulation will be used to evaluate whether reactive 
or proactive approaches are better for creating safety policies that address hazards on both large 
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and small scale wildfire incidents, and at which levels of governance those approaches are being 
employed. 
Results and Discussion 
In Chapter 5, I begin by discussing how firefighter safety policy has been produced, 
applied, and circulated in a historical context. The first examples will be used to show how safety 
policy evolved reactively following tragic events, many of which were in response to fire related 
hazards where people were burned. The most recent historical example to evolve in this manner, 
the Eagle Fire, deviated from the previous examples because it was in relation to a medical 
emergency rather than a fire-related hazard. Because this event led to the creation of the first 
comprehensive medical policy via the reactive approach, it will serve as an analytical 
comparison to two more recent medical response policies that have occurred within individual 
fire management agencies which followed the proactive approach to policy production.  
After comparing how reactive and proactive approaches are produced, applied, and 
circulated, I move on to discuss the implications these approaches have in relation to large and 
small incident scales, as well as organization scales of governance where safety policies are 
enacted. Wildfire incident scales, defined as large or small, are in reference to the size of the 
incident – and because the resources and management approaches for these scales are different, 
this designation can have substantive impacts on firefighters once a fire is designated as a certain 
size. Additionally, it is important to consider which levels of organizational management either 
reactive or proactive approaches to policy production are being applied to. After thoughtfully 
reflecting on these topics, I will discuss what I view as the best path to move forward for federal 
fire management agencies to address emergency medical response. 
Telling the Story 
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Finally, the last chapter conclude the project and briefly tell the overall story of safety 
policy within federal fire management. By considering the history of policy production and 
alternative ways of moving forward, my hope is to produce a useful policy analysis that can help 
to inform federal fire management agencies about the very important topic of firefighter safety, 
and more particularly, emergency medical response. If our society has deemed it necessary that 
firefighters risk everything to protect our communities, it is our obligation to provide firefighters 
with the best possible support to help them do their jobs and come home at the end of the day.   
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Chapter 2: Research Context 
 To situate the research context of my project, I will discuss bodies of literature relevant to 
my research question that consider how natural disaster policy process occurs, how it is 
informed, and to which scales resulting policies are applicable. Section 2.1 reviews literature on 
the production of governmental policy with a particular focus on Birkland’s Lessons of Disaster: 
Policy Change after Catastrophic Events (2006), which provides a contextual background of the 
policy process following disasters. Birkland’s observations are useful when considering the 
evolution of firefighter safety policy and how “focusing events” often drive the safety policy 
process. But, a reactive approach can mean policy makers miss opportunities to proactively 
respond to a problem by investigating issues before they turn into a catastrophe. Section 2.2 
reviews a slice of literature within the broader field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
that discusses policy change occurring at the “science-policy interface,” which will show how 
empirical knowledge can be subjectively used to influence policy. Specifically, this section 
explains how political underpinnings can make certain scientific information “count” more than 
other pieces of information. Additionally, I will discuss how scientific knowledge is produced, 
applied to specific policies, and circulated over space to affected individuals to address a specific 
issue following a catastrophic focusing event, a process that will be particularly useful for 
evaluating the construction of firefighter safety policy and the scales where it is impactful. 
Though the field of STS encompasses much more than I will consider within the context of this 
project, the insights I will discuss are particularly relevant to my investigation of firefighter 
safety. Lastly, section 2.3 reviews literature on the geographic concept of scale as it applies to 
issues that are designated as either “large” or “small” scale. Though many geographic scholars 
recognize that these designations are socially constructed, concepts of scale nonetheless have 
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substantive impacts when applied to specific policies. If focusing events that influence policy 
tend to happen more frequently at certain scales, it may impact the scales where updated policies 
are effective – which is investigated specifically in respect to firefighter safety policy in this 
project. 
Section 2.1 – The Policy Process, Natural Disasters, and Focusing Events  
 This section will introduce concepts related to the ways in which government policy is 
created. In Section 2.1 – A, I consider the theory of “bounded rationality” of organizations 
responsible for policy creation and how that factor shapes policy cycles. In Section 2.1 – B, I will 
more specifically consider how policies are created within natural hazards management to 
outline basic principles of disaster response. In Section 2.1 – C, I discuss “focusing events” that 
often serve as a catalyst for policy changes within “policy domains prone to disaster,” and how 
responding to problems in this manner may be less effective than proactively addressing an issue 
before it turns catastrophic. 
Section 2.1 – A – Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning. To begin, it is 
important to consider the broader realm of policy production. In the United States, government 
organizations involved in the policy-making process all face similar challenges (Simon, 1957). 
Organizations are comprised of a diverse workforce completing tasks at different levels of 
management and must coordinate to produce acceptable governing outcomes over space (Simon, 
1957). Underpinning governmental responses to a particular issue is what Simon identified as 
“bounded rationality.” Bounded rationality impacts individual or organizational decision making 
because:  
the intended rationality of an actor requires him to construct a simplified model of the 
real situation in order to deal with it. He behaves rationally with respect to this model, 
and such behavior is not even approximately optimal with respect to the real world. To 
predict his behavior, we must understand the way in which this simplified model is 
10 
 
constructed, and its construction will certainly be related to his psychological properties 
as a perceiving, thinking, and learning animal (Simon, 1957, p. 199) 
 
The concept of bounded rationality has been used to describe organizational learning (Mileti, 
2001; Birkland, 2006; Sabatier and Weible, 2014) and helps to demonstrate the limitations that 
both individuals and organizations have in respect to decision making. Both individuals and 
institutions attempt to create basic explanations regarding a particular issue in order to evaluate 
and understand that issue. As a result, both individuals and organizations are said to be bounded 
by their own rationality. Though they are capable of understanding parts of a whole, they are 
limited by the fact that there is no way to conceive all the pieces and “correctly” construct them 
into a whole. As a result, this process influences organizational decision making when 
characterizing problems and solutions to address a specific issue in a specific place. 
 Although there are many accounts that attempt to demonstrate how bounded rationality 
influences organizations, one particularly useful explanation is “punctuated equilibrium theory” 
(Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortenson, 2014). Borrowing from the concept of punctuated 
equilibrium in evolutionary biology, this concept attempts to explain how governing institutions 
behave during periods of “stasis or punctuation” (Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, 2014). 
Though most governmental organizations attempt to maintain stasis and avoid major 
fluctuations, they are not immune to change, and when change comes in the form of a large and 
transformative event, there are often updated policy responses that attempt to bring an 
organization back to a state of stability.  
The theory of punctuated equilibrium finds its roots within Herbert Simon’s theory of 
bounded rationality. One way of identifying issues that need to be responded to is through 
recognizing large concerns that may inhibit an organization’s ability to maintain stasis. In this 
way, punctuated equilibrium theory asserts that: 
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Policymaking institutions seem to add friction to the process of translating inputs into 
policy outputs. This friction acts to delay action on issues until enough pressure develops 
to overcome this institutional resistance. Then there is a lurch or punctuation in 
policymaking. Friction, which leads to punctuated dynamics, rather than gridlock 
characterizes American national political institutions (Baumgartner, Jones, and 
Mortenson, 2014, p. 83). 
 
In other words, the policy production process does not follow an incremental or logistic 
trajectory where changes accumulate evenly over time. Instead, tensions existing within the 
system force policymaking institutions to respond. If the scale of the issue is perceived as too 
small to garner attention, it may not receive the attention required to produce a change – but if a 
large scale issue attracts significant attention, policy makers may identify that issue as worthy of 
a political response. 
 This observation helps to describe how policy changes within governing institutions. 
Since organizations must receive stimulus to respond to issues, their response will not be evenly 
prescribed in all circumstances, but rather will reflect the urgency of those perceiving the issue. 
As a result: 
The general punctuation hypothesis suggests that information processing is 
disproportionate. That is, policymaking alternates between periods of underreaction and 
overreaction to the flow of information coming in from the environment. This reaction 
may stem from a vivid event that symbolizes everything that is wrong (Birkland, 1997) or 
from the accumulation of problems over longer periods (Baumgartner, Jones, and 
Mortenson, 2014, p. 83). 
 
In other words, policy making institutions may be tasked with different objectives, but generally 
follow a path where outside perturbations prompt the organization to learn and adapt to new 
circumstances. Since organizations are bounded by their own rationality, they do not always 
produce an even response. While this is asserted to be true of all American political 
organizations, this is particularly true of those tasked with managing natural disasters or other 
disruptive events that can have a major impact on the normal functioning of that organization. 
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Section 2.1 – B – Disasters and the policy process. Government agencies that are 
responsible for managing disasters are constantly required to learn from and adapt to outside 
perturbations. The field of natural hazards management is constantly adapting to new 
circumstances, partly because natural hazards are becoming exacerbated by anthropogenic 
climate change (Godschalk et al., 1999; IPCC SREX, 2013) and partly because the underlying 
social circumstances are constantly changing. In his book Disasters by Design: A Reassessment 
of Natural Hazards in the United States, Mileti states “that natural hazards are the result of 
interacting natural and social forces and that hazards and their impacts can be reduced through 
individual and social adjustment” (Mileti, 1999, p. 19). This is why hazards scholars view natural 
disasters as socially constructed – though humans may not be directly responsible for a 
catastrophic weather event such as a hurricane, they are responsible for developments that may 
be built in areas that can be expected to be impacted, or for the pre-established social systems 
that may or may not alleviate pressures once a disturbance event occurs (Mileti, 1999). Since 
much of the impact created by a disturbance is related to underlying social systems, disasters can 
be made less severe by considering those factors.  
 Updated policies are the means by which governing agencies “adjust” in the face of 
known and expected natural hazards. Since many natural hazards are predictable in the sense that 
we understand a specific hazard has occurred in a particular area and likely will again in the 
future, the political responses to these events are also predictable. In the case of natural disasters, 
there are said to be four phases that occur before, during, and after catastrophes; mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery (Godschalk, et al., 1999, Natural Hazard Mitigation p. 5). 
Mitigation occurs in advance of a natural hazard and is related to the ways people construct the 
environment in areas prone to disaster before they happen; preparedness occurs immediately 
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before a hazard and attempts to stave off the worst effects; response occurs immediately after the 
event has occurred and focuses on the most pressing issues; recovery occurs after the event has 
subsided and attempts to restore normal functioning of the community (Godschalk, et al., 1999, 
p. 5). This cycle is significant because it establishes the four key time elements that are 
incorporated into governing agencies’ reactions to a disturbance either before, during, or after it 
occurs. Because disasters are socially constructed, considering how and when governing bodies 
respond to them can be critical when attempting to create a more effective response. If 
governmental agencies did more to mitigate and prepare for expected hazards, perhaps the 
response and recovery phases could be made less severe. 
Section 2.1 – C – Focusing Events, Windows of Opportunity, and the Policy Process. 
The insights discussed above are demonstrated by Birkland in his book Lessons of Disaster: 
Policy Change after Catastrophic Events where he discusses how catastrophic events that garner 
significant public attention often spur policymakers to address whatever the perceived problem 
is. Birkland refers to these as “potential focusing events,” which are defined as: 
events that are sudden, relatively rare, can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing 
the possibility of potentially greater future harms, inflicts harm or suggests potential 
harms that are or could be concentrated on a definable geographic area or community of 
interest, and that is known to policy makers and the public almost simultaneously 
(Birkland, 1997, p. 22) 
 
Focusing events are often used as a chance to make policy changes while people are aware of a 
specific problem, what Birkland refers to as “windows of opportunity” for policy reform 
(Birkland, 2006). He discusses how this concept applies to many different types of catastrophes 
with a focus on the different ways that governmental organizations learn from and react to major 
setbacks. He describes this reactive approach to policy production as “political learning,” where 
a large perturbation is required to gain the attention of the organization. This is contrasted with a 
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proactive approach to organizational learning referred to as “social learning,” where 
organizations seek out and attempt to expose weaknesses before a problem arises.  
While it comes as little surprise that major disturbance events can inspire political action, 
Birkland is careful to display how catastrophic events of different types and magnitudes 
influence policy differently. For the purposes of discussing policy change, he refers to three 
types of disturbances: crises, disasters, and catastrophes. A crisis is the smallest of the three types 
of disturbances and may be induced by human actions or a natural event such as the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill; disasters are larger and may include earthquakes or terrorist attacks like those 
that occurred on September 11, 2001; and catastrophes are considered the largest such as 
Hurricane Katrina (Birkland, 2006). When considering how an event is determined to be a crises, 
disaster, or catastrophe, Birkland states:  
Whether or how crises emerge depends upon the way in which they are interpreted by 
relevant actors, which determines whether these events become policy issues. (Birkland, 
2006, p. 3) 
 
In other words, there are no administrative cutoff points that define one event as a “catastrophe” 
and another as a “crisis.” Rather, these determinations are socially constructed in that the 
response (or lack of response) by policy makers may be heavily influenced the perceptions of the 
public or other relevant actors. 
Similar to the discussion of “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory” where large punctuations 
attract the most attention, Birkland’s designations of disturbance events in relation to different 
scales are important points to highlight. Again, unsurprisingly, the largest catastrophes garner the 
most attention. Events such as Hurricane Katrina were undeniably significantto that region and to 
the country as a whole, leaving little room for policy makers to do anything other than attempt to 
respond to the incident as fast as possible. While smaller crisis events may sometimes expose a 
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weakness and lead to policy reform, they may not excite the gamut of policy makers in the same 
way that a major earthquake in Los Angeles might. In some cases, this may mean that smaller 
crises events might have to happen multiple times before there is enough recognition of the 
problem to create real change. These points will be raised later in reference to firefighter safety 
policy, which often evolves following the largest focusing events. 
The size and perception of focusing events are an important consideration when 
investigating how knowledge is produced and used to inform policy changes. Birkland notes that 
it is rare for a major disturbance to reveal completely unknown shortcomings when he says: 
“new facts combine with old ideas in windows of opportunity for change” (Birkland, 2006, p. 
60). In other words, the weaknesses of a system may have been known, but no action was taken 
to mitigate potential harm until something happened, at which point the usual policy avenues of 
investigations occur. With this in mind, it may be worthwhile to question this process. Though a 
catastrophic event may provide an opportune time to reform policy, is it not possible to address 
these issues before harm is caused? Rather than waiting for bad things to happen before 
investigating an issue, Birkland suggests a more proactive approach when he says: 
This is the situation we face today with much of the current policy on natural disasters, 
which emphasizes relief and recovery rather than mitigation. This emphasis actually 
encourages people to build in flood prone areas and otherwise behave in ways they 
wouldn’t if government policies didn’t distort their sense of self-interest by shifting the 
risk from individuals to society as a whole. (Birkland, 2006, p. 181) 
 
In other words, Birkland recognizes that there are multiple opportunities to address issues, and 
while it may be convenient politically to wait until something catastrophic has happened to 
produce change, it also may have many negative impacts that could be altogether avoided if there 




 Birkland’s book discusses how policy change occurs in “policy domains prone to 
disaster” such as aviation security or natural disaster response and recovery. These policy 
domains are prone to disaster because they are organizations that are tasked with managing 
incidents that can be expected to behave in unexpected ways (Birkland, 2006). Among the policy 
domains prone to disaster is the field of federal wildland fire management, and more specifically, 
safety management of those working for federal fire management agencies. Similar to Birkland’s 
discussion of the policy process that often follows catastrophic events, the largest federal 
wildland firefighter safety policy changes have evolved reactively following focusing events 
which shine the light on a specific problem and can lead to policy changes. Other policies have 
recently been created which take a more proactive approach, as Birkland suggests, but they have 
not been significant changes that comprehensively changed federal safety policies. 
This research project will apply insights from Birkland when considering the selection of 
historical cases that will be analyzed in future chapters. Just as Birkland identified common 
themes within different policy domains prone to disaster, I will identify common themes that 
have occurred among iconic examples of firefighter safety policy change that can be 
characterized as reactive because they occurred following a catastrophic event during the 
response and recovery phases. Along with considering the reactive policy process that typically 
characterizes the evolution of major safety policy changes, I will also discuss two recent 
examples that have occurred within individual agencies that take a proactive approach to 
providing safety to firefighters by conducting investigations during the preparedness and 
mitigation phases rather than waiting for an accident to happen. The reactive and proactive 
approaches suggested by Birkland will be used to analyze which approach is most applicable to 
safety hazards that occur on both large and small scale incidents.  
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 Considering the context of this research project, the aforementioned aspects of policy 
production within policy domains prone to disaster will be useful insights. As is demonstrated in 
Figure 2.1 under reactive approaches, firefighter safety policy created by the federal government 
is generally marked by punctuations where a focusing event occurred and forced fire 
management agencies to work within the bounds of their own rationality to update policies via 
political learning. Generally speaking, a tragic incident involving a firefighter creates a window 
of opportunity for policy change. Though this process has served as the primary means of 
creating firefighter safety policy, it is only occurring as a reaction to something that already 
happened, meaning organizational learning can only take place during the response and recovery 
phases when many other pressing issues are also occurring. In contrast, as demonstrated in 
Figure 2.1 under proactive approaches, there are other approaches within individual agencies that 
exemplify social learning within policy production because the knowledge used to inform 
policies is proactively attained during the preparedness and mitigation phases and does not favor 
large or small fires. This project focuses on whether the reactive or proactive process to safety 
policy production is best suited for addressing safety hazards at both large and small scales of 
incident management. Birkland’s insights about natural disaster planning are relevant as they 
suggest that policy changes that occur during windows of opportunity may not be the best time to 
create policy. The following sections will build off of the concepts developed in this section, 





Section 2.2 – Science and Technology Studies and the Policy Process  
To understand a policy problem, it is important to understand the policy cycle that often 
follows catastrophic events. From here, it is useful to more specifically analyze the types of 
information used to inform policies that were updated as a result of some outside perturbation. 
The information that is used to inform policies can have direct impacts on how governmental 
policies play out over space, who they influence, and what the effects are at different scales of 
management. This is particularly the case with firefighter safety policy, where the “science” 
behind firefighter safety tends to focus on catastrophic worst-case-scenario accidents occurring 
on large fires at the expense of more common injuries occurring on smaller fires. Though the 
broader field of STS encompasses much more than I will discuss in relation to my research, the 
insights I will discuss are particularly relevant within the context of this research. In Section 2.2 
– A, I review literature on the social creation of scientific policy. Next, Section 2.2 – B will 
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review STS literature relevant to organizational learning and expound off of ideas discussed by 
Birkland. Finally, Section 2.2 – C will review literature that considers what knowledge “counts” 
during policy production, and how that knowledge is produced, applied to policies, and 
circulated over space in order to lay a theoretical base for arguments that will be made about 
firefighter safety policy in future chapters.  
Section 2.2 – A – STS and Socially Constructing Science. In contemporary times 
where much of our daily lives is dictated by scientific or technological advances, many people 
take science for granted, viewing it as an objective approach to understanding natural truths. In 
1979, Latour and Woolgar made assertions about “the construction of a fact” and the ways by 
which science produces information that is perceived as truth (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). As 
some of the first to utilize the lens of sociology in respect to the production of science, their 
landmark book Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts was one of the first 
major publications that led to the modern field of Science and Technology Studies. In it, they 
question the social underpinnings that designate some types of knowledge as “factual.” In this 
case, they say that to leave science unquestioned as natural truth “entails the perception that a 
fact is something which is simply recorded in an article and that it has neither been socially 
constructed nor possesses its own history of construction” (Latour and Woolgar, 1979, p. 105). 
In other words, they are questioning the way science is viewed as given, not made. If science is 
being used to inform decision making, how might the assumption that it is “factual” rather than 
socially and politically constructed influence how decisions are made? 
Latour and Woolgar helped to advance the field by displaying the social underpinnings of 
science, and since then, others have furthered those claims by questioning other aspects of the 
scientific process. As Sismondo explains in his book An Introduction to Science and Technology 
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Studies (2004), STS came about in response to the traditional ways science was approached, 
which were generally focused on empirically demonstrating a claim with scientifically tested and 
repeatable evidence. This form of conducting science is referred to as “logical positivism,” with 
the notion that natural truths exist and that scientists just need to go out and find them. While 
there are other competing scientific philosophies, logical positivism is the primary method used 
by most scientists today. When discussing logical positivism, Sismondo says: 
standards or norms are the source of science’s success and authority. For positivists, the 
key is that theories can be no more or no less than the logical representation of data.…. 
Therefore, the view of science we have seen so far is not merely an abstraction from 
science, but is importantly a view of ideal science. (Sismondo, 2004, p. 8) 
 
Sismondo reveals the underlying philosophies of logical positivism not only to demonstrate its 
limited scope, but to show that a more complete picture can be generated if one is consciously 
considering the positive and negative aspects of this philosophy. Within the context of STS, it is 
an important observation that the creation of “standards” is the means by which “ideal science” 
is created. Since standards are thought of as repeatable, they are also viewed as objective.  
While the creation of standards is critical to the many advancements science has allowed 
humanity to achieve, we must not lose sight of the fact that the standards were not only created 
by humans, but later carried out and repeated by other humans. How were cutoff points 
established for specific standards, and by whom? Once standards were created, how did different 
people perceive those standards? In cases where cutoff points were within the margin of error, 
how might different scientists decide how to handle those cases differently? With this in mind, 
we can see that the standards upon which science is based are no less social than the humans 
carrying out the science.  
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In other words, the claims of objectivity that stem from standardized, repeatable scientific 
testing become questionable. To further this claim, Sismondo states that STS came about as a 
response to standardized scientific processes when he states:  
there is no such thing, at least in normal circumstances, as raw observation. Instead, 
observation comes interpreted: we do not see dots and lines in our visual fields, but 
instead see more or less recognizable objects and patterns. Thus observation is guided by 
concepts and ideas. This claim has become known as the theory-dependence of 
observation. The theory-dependence of observation is easily linked to Kuhn’s historical 
picture, because during revolutions people stop seeing one way, and start seeing another 
way, guided by the new paradigm. (p. 16) 
 
In other words, observations are socially contingent because not all people will observe 
phenomena in the same way. Because the standardization of observation serves as a cornerstone 
of modernist science, the recognition that observations are shaped by the eye of the beholder is 
particularly critical when questioning the “objectivity” of science.  
When discussing the policy process, Birkland (2006) noted that catastrophes bring about 
new modes of thinking that are applied to previously established ways of knowing during 
windows of opportunity for policy reform. Additionally, the designation of the size of the 
catastrophe can impact the priority placed on response, which sometimes means that events 
perceived to be less serious may garner less attention for policy reform than events perceived to 
be more serious. If this mode of knowledge creation serves as the standard of understanding 
through which we conceptualize a problem, might that shape the types of responses individuals 
or organizations come up with? Do current approaches to organizational learning and policy 
production favor the “most serious” accidents to the point that “less serious accidents” are 
overlooked? This is but one avenue through which STS helps to reveal shortcomings in specific 
modes of knowledge production. 
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Section 2.2 – B – STS and Organizational Learning. While Sismondo attempts to 
situate STS more generally, other theorists have focused more explicitly on aspects that are ripe 
for deconstruction through the lens of STS. In their paper “Organizations in the making: 
Learning and intervening at the science-policy interface,” Pallet and Chilvers discuss how 
varying scales of an organization learn and react to change with a particular focus on the 
“science-policy interface.” As the name implies, the science-policy interface considers how 
scientific information is applied to policy responses. 
 Similar to sentiments discussed in Section 2.2, Pallet and Chilvers focus on a context of 
organizational learning. By looking at how different actors within an organization are related and 
considering what evidence they base decisions off of, the authors challenge common 
assumptions about how organizational learning takes place. Because organizations operating at 
the science-policy interface rely upon empirical evidence to support management decisions, their 
perspectives tend to follow the same logical positivist underpinnings upon which the empirical 
evidence is based. When discussing scientific knowledge within the context of organizational 
learning, the author’s state: 
The consequence of opening up the black box of scientific knowledge was the 
implication that there could be other kinds of knowledge situated within different settings 
which might have something valuable to contribute to science-policy contexts. The idea 
of situated knowledge (e.g. Haraway, 1991) also resonated with geographical work, and 
both geographers and STS scholars have been concerned with engaging lay (i.e. non-
expert) knowledges to provide alternative accounts and destabilize hidden power 
relationships. (Pallet and Chilvers, 2014, p. 7) 
 
Here, Pallet and Chilvers show that not all forms of knowledge can be captured within the 
context of standard approaches to science.  
This quote helps to show how things that cannot be tested are left out of the picture when 
considering science that is supposedly relevant to a problem. If there is some social aspect that is 
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not testable or clearly identifiable, it may be left out of scientific findings because it is not 
regarded as “objective.” In essence, the authors are attempting to show how science and 
knowledge are a double edge sword when applied to politics, both informing about the unknown 
while simultaneously revealing the finiteness of our ways of knowing. As a result of the 
limitations of science as a way of knowing, the “facts” that are produced can be selectively used 
as objective evidence to inform political policies. 
Section 2.2 – C – STS, what science counts, and how it is transformed into policy. In 
her book Reframing Climate Change (2016), O’Lear investigates how knowledge can be 
selectively used by governing institutions because it fits more conveniently into the current 
political context. Well established government agencies are limited by the structures that exist to 
support certain types of policies. In this way, it may be simpler for a government agency to favor 
certain types of science to inform policy decisions because of the predetermined missions of that 
respective agency. She highlights how science can be selectively used to inform political 
decisions when she states: 
“A widely held view of science is that it is distinct and separate from politics and can 
therefore provide objective guidance to policy. This view dates back to Vannevar Bush’s 
report for President F.D. Roosevelt entitled Science, the Endless Frontier (Bush, 1945). 
In that report, Bush promoted a dualistic vision of basic, research-based science, on the 
one hand, and applied product development, on the other hand: the ‘R’ and ‘D’ of 
‘research and development’ or the idea of pure, impartial science as necessarily distinct 
from political applications (see also Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). This binary view 
promotes science – rooted in certainty, fact, and truth – as playing an advisory role to 
values-driven policy (Price 1965) or rather, as ‘speaking truth to power.’” (O’Lear, 2016, 
p. 100) 
 
What impacts might the perception of science as impartial have when formulating policy? Is it 
fair to represent science as an objective tool for informing governmental decisions when in fact 
there are often social or political underpinnings? Much of O’Lear’s insight stems from the fact 
that the scientific method, though useful for explicitly defining some natural “truth,” can also 
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create many more questions than answers, or what is referred to as “scientific uncertainty.” 
When the limits of scientific methodology are reached, decisions that are inherently social in 
nature must be made. When considering how incomplete scientific knowledge is applied to 
policy, scientific uncertainty may pose “problems” because the pace of knowledge discovery is 
often far behind the pace of the policy process. When situations such as this arise, scientists must 
work within the confines of the information they have and make decisions based on the best 
evidence available. Though many often view decisions by policy makers to proceed with 
incomplete, but nonetheless “scientific” information as objective, the fact is that these decisions 
frequently inject social preferences into policy. This will be an important point within the context 
of the formulation of firefighter safety policy, where there is an abundance of information related 
to fatalities and serious accidents, but little information available to inform policies that attempt 
to mitigate minor injuries. 
 The processes by which scientific information becomes socialized are a few of many 
revelations that STS helps to bring about, though it is worth noting the field as a whole considers 
more beyond points related to the socialization of knowledge. One specific insight developed 
through the broader field of STS is related to how policies are created and operationalized. While 
the context of who is involved with decision making at the science-policy interface has been 
discussed, the means by which this process occurs can be effectively demonstrated when 
considering one specific insight within the broader field of STS, which comes from Goldman’s 
book Knowing Nature: Conversations at the Intersection of Political Ecology and Science 
Studies, where she discusses the relevance of STS to the creation of environmental policy. 
Particularly useful is her deconstruction of the policy process, which she has broken down into 
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the stages of production, application, and circulation. She underlines the relevance of this 
approach to policymaking when she says: 
“How applied research agendas are established, funded, pursued, and evaluated shapes 
the production of environmental knowledge. Management approaches (i.e., the 
“application” of environmental knowledge) are constructed from a mix of common 
understandings about human societies and the environment, scientific findings and 
technologies, standard (accepted) management approaches, political and economic 
prerogatives, and location specific understandings… The production of environmental 
scientific knowledge is shaped by management goals and directives as well as widely 
circulated ideas about society and environment. Clearly, the politics surrounding 
environmental management is not simply the playing out of material interests but is 
animated by competing knowledge claims about the environment. The outcome of these 
struggles shape the kind of “environments” that are produced and promoted, and whose 
purpose stretches of ground, water, and air serve.” (Goldman, 2011, p. 2-3) 
 
In other words, Goldman is critiquing the way in which scientific knowledge is actually 
translated into a specific policy, what impact that has, and who those decisions serve (or don’t 
serve). By deconstructing the process by which scientific knowledge is produced, considering the 
ways in which that knowledge was applied to a specific policy, and investigating how that policy 
is circulated over space, it becomes possible to see what material affects a specific policy will 
have in relation to those impacted by the policy. 
 This process will be particularly critical within the context of this research project 
because Goldman’s process of identifying the phases of production, application, and circulation 
offer a lens through which both reactive and proactive approaches to firefighter safety policy 
production can be analyzed and evaluated. This process dovetails nicely with Birkland’s 
observations, as is demonstrated in Figure 2.2. Among federal fire management agencies, a 
focusing event can shed light on a problem and prompt an investigation which then produces 
new knowledge about that problem. This new information can then be applied to a specific 
policy that is designed to address the problem. Finally, the updated policy is then circulated to 
affected individuals during windows of opportunity for policy change. This process will be used 
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in my methodology section where the phases of production, application, and circulation will be 
used as criteria to evaluate the case studies under consideration for this project. 
Figure 2.2 
 
As has been shown, STS can be a useful perspective for analyzing government policy 
that is informed by scientific information. Once knowledge is applied to a specific policy reform, 
organizations that are impacted by that policy must find ways to operationalize the updates and 
disseminate them to affected individuals. The dissemination of policy is often achieved through 
the designation of scale within a given organization. How will policies play out at either local or 
national scales? How will policies be applied differently to larger or smaller scale issues? While 
these are important questions, it is necessary to deconstruct the underlying assumptions that 
allow these questions to be asked in the first place. The next section will consider how the social 
construction of scale may produce uneven material impacts when a given policy is applied to 
various scales of organizational management.  
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Section 2.3 – The Social Construction of Scale 
Often underpinning natural disaster policies are hierarchical scales of governance among 
and within different organizations that are used to construct a vehicle for management. Section 
2.3 – A will consider the ways in which geographic conceptions of scale are operationalized. 
Though the concept of scale may be easily taken for granted, there remains to be a fixed 
definition of what scale is precisely. According to Marston, Jones and Woodward (2005), “there 
is substantial confusion surrounding the meaning of scale as size –what is also called a horizontal 
measure of ‘scope’ or ‘extensiveness’ – and scale as level – a vertically imagined, ‘nested 
hierarchical ordering of space (Howitt, 2002, 305)’.”  Because scale can be used to characterize 
processes of different sizes or that occur at different levels, human geographers have found this 
concept particularly useful, however it has been more recently contested as a social construction 
(Marston, 2000; Marston, Jones and Woodward, 2005). Section 2.3 – B will discuss how 
designations of scale can have substantive impacts when applied to policy. This discussion will 
be useful within the context of my project because while administrative designations of “large” 
and “small” wildfire incidents are in fact socially constructed, they nonetheless have material 
impacts on individuals operating within those scales. 
Section 2.3 – A – The Concept of Scale – Size and Level. Beginning in the 1980s, a 
series of papers by human geographers was published that considered “The social construction of 
scale” (Marston, 2000), which advocated viewing hierarchical designations as socially produced 
rather than predetermined facts. Though designations of scale may be useful for describing 
certain phenomena, that usefulness changes depending upon the context, what Howitt refers to 
as: “the apparent paradox of scale – that it matters, but is almost meaningless as a stand-alone 
concept: it only matters in context – as a co-constituent of complex and dynamic geographic 
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totalities” (Agnew, Mitchell and Toal, 2003). While scale may be a useful in referring to various 
levels or sizes in relation to a specific issue, it is important to understand that the underlying 
assumptions about scale are not only socially created, but politically motivated. Were specific 
scales designated as such because it was politically convenient or fit neatly within a specific 
policy context? If so, what impacts might this have on those affected by the policy? Because 
scale is a socially constructed phenomenon, the designation of ‘large or small,’ or ‘global or 
local’ can have significant political or material impacts that may privilege some groups at the 
expense of marginalized groups (Agnew, Mitchell and Toal, 2003). 
 Marston (2000) refers to three different ways scale may be used in geography; 
cartographic scale is used in reference to mapping; geographic scale is used for describing how 
social or physical occurrences play out over space; and operational scale is used for describing 
how geographic processes intermingle at different scales of organizational management. 
Operational scale is a particularly relevant concept within geographic studies that investigate 
how “large” or “small” issues impact greater activities or responses within society. When 
considering the political implications of designating scale as either large or small, it is important 
to ask what actually constitutes “large” or “small,” the distinctions between them, and who 
determines those cutoff points. To more aptly characterize these observations, Smith (1992) 
introduced the concept of “the politics of scale.”  The politics that underpin the social 
construction of scale should not be overlooked when investigating geographic issues,  because “it 
is geographical scale that defines the boundaries and bounds the identities around which control 
is exerted and contested” (Marston, 2000). 
Section 2.3 – B – The Material Impacts of Scalar Designations. Acknowledging the 
politics of scale is important for analyzing how scalar designations play out over space and how 
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scale may influence or characterize the way problems are perceived. Marston notes that “the 
particular ways in which scale is constructed – are tangible and have material consequences” 
(Marston, 2000). The ways in which designations of scale influence processes occurring at 
various scales has been referred to as “scale bending,” where normalized social or political 
operations are assumed to specifically fit a particular scale without questioning why or how it fits 
(Marston, Jones, and Woodward, 2005). In this way, certain scales are privileged or assumed to 
be more important than other scales. For example, geographic problems that are characterized as 
“large scale” may warrant more political attention than problems that are characterized as “small 
scale.” Again, Howitt lends a useful observation when he says “it has been easy to privilege one 
scale or another as the pre-eminent platform for political action” (Howitt, 2002, quoted by 
Agnew, Mitchell and Toal, 2003). If underlying assumptions about scale are unquestioningly 
applied to political actions, policies that are assumed to universally apply to a problem at all 
scales may actually fall short.  
 Those who have contested normalized conceptions of scale recognize that social relations 
influence how scalar designations effect politics over space (Bulkeley, 2005). Because of the 
inherent conflictions relating to the politics of scale, some have borrowed from Actor-Network 
Theory to reimagine “Human Geography without Scale” (Marston, Jones and Woodward, 2005). 
This approach is “premised on the understanding that shifting and contested scalar configurations 
are neither entirely local nor global but operate by way of networks that are always 
simultaneously ‘deeply localized’ as well as being extensive in their reach” (Marston, Jones and 
Woodward, 2005). As a result of this work, the idea of replacing scale with “flat ontologies” that 
recognize networks rather than socially constructed scalar designations has challenged 
conventional conceptions of scale.  
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Though scale can be problematic if it is used unquestioningly, it can still serve as a useful 
reference for analyzing political processes that use these designations. This observation is made 
by Jones when she says:  
once we accept that participants in political disputes deploy arguments about scale 
discursively, alternately representing their position as global or local to enhance their 
standing, we must also accept that scale itself is a representational trope, a way of 
framing political spatiality that in turn has material effects (Marston, Jones, Woodward 
2005 quoting Jones, 1998). 
 
In other words, as long as scale is acknowledged as socially constructed and not naturally 
predetermined, it can serve as a useful analytical tool for demonstrating how designations of 
scale can have “material effects” on those who are (or are not) part of a specific set of scales. 
Moving forward, this project will critically consider how scale is administratively constructed 
and the material effects the construction of scale may have upon governed subjects.  
Within the context of this project, geographic theory related to the social construction of 
scale will be used to show how scalar designations of wildfire incidents as either “large” or 
“small” can have material effects on firefighters operating within those scales of incident 
management. As Figure 2.5 shows, firefighter safety policy typically evolves following a tragic 
incident such as a firefighter fatality or serious injury. If the incident is perceived as serious 
enough, an accident investigation will follow that produces new information, applies the 
information to updated safety policies, and circulates those updates to affected individuals during 
windows of opportunity for policy change. Because political learning shapes the investigations 
and corresponding policy changes that selectively focus on worst-case-scenario accidents 
occurring on large scales during the response and recovery phases, the policies that are created 
may also selectively favor policies that only address worst-case-scenario hazards occurring at 
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large scales of wildfire management, thus not accounting for less severe hazards occurring on 
smaller scale wildfires.  
Figure 2.3 offers a proactive alternative to the traditional process by instituting social 
learning during the preparedness and recovery phases. This approach does not selectively favor 
large scale issues, but rather inquires which scales are impacted by a given issue. These two 
approaches will be evaluated to determine whether a reactive or proactive approach to policy 
production best addresses safety hazards on both large and small scale wildfire incidents. 
Figure 2.3: 
 
Section 2.4 – Conclusion  
 This chapter has presented bodies of literature that are relevant within the context of this 
research project. Policy domains that are prone to disaster often reactively use focusing events as 
an opportunity to create policy change. While this is one possible way for organizational learning 
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to occur, the process of waiting for something bad to happen before a response is warranted may 
mean that catastrophes that could have proactively been prevented go undetected. After 
establishing the way policies change following focusing events, I introduced STS literature that 
specifically considers how knowledge is used to inform policy change. Though scientific 
knowledge is often privileged as being “objective” and therefore useful for informing policy, it is 
clear that social underpinnings frequently influence the way knowledge is used and 
characterized. The types of information that are selectively used to inform policy will influence 
the production, application, and circulation of corresponding policy changes. Finally, any 
changes that may occur as a result of policy updates do not apply universally to all levels of 
management – rather, organizations utilize administratively designated determinations of scale to 
apply policy updates to specific issues that may be either large or small. Though these 
designations are socially constructed, they still have material impacts on those who are included 
or excluded from specific designations of scale. If a reactive or proactive approach to policy 
production favors either large or small scale issues, the corresponding policies may not be as 
effective as they could be. Now that the research context has been established, I will move 














Chapter 3: A Background of Fire Management and Firefighter Safety Policy 
This chapter is intended to provide a brief background of federal fire management and 
safety policy. In Section 3.1, I begin with a brief discussion about the five federal agencies 
tasked with managing wildfire. Because these agencies have different stated purposes in regards 
to land management yet still must cooperate during fire management operations, these agencies 
must standardize procedures with respect to fire management – with one such way being the 
designation of large and small scale wildfires. Section 3.2 will discuss how these agencies 
administratively designate both large and small scale wildfire incidents, as these designations 
play vital roles when investigating how effective safety management policies are at these 
respective scales.  
In section 3.3, I will discuss historical events that have impacted fire policy within federal 
fire management, beginning in 1905 with the creation of the Forest Service extending to present 
day. The intention of this is to provide a brief prelude to the way that federal firefighter safety 
policy has generally evolved throughout U.S. history and show how the major policy changes 
generally followed the most visceral incidents occurring on large scale fires. The most recent 
example I will discuss, the Eagle Fire of 2008, is significant within the context of this project 
because it is the only example of a comprehensive change to emergency medical response policy 
in the history of federal wildland fire management.  
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In Section 3.4, I will briefly discuss the background to emergency medical response 
policy for federal wildland firefighters. Unlike many structure firefighters working for municipal 
departments, wildland firefighters working for the federal government do not have qualified and 
trained Emergency Medical Providers on crews. There are several legal and jurisdictional 
barriers that underpin these issues, yet this remains one of the most significant safety 
vulnerabilities federal firefighters’ face. Section 3.5 will conclude the chapter. This chapter is 






Section 3.1 – The Five Federal Land Management Agencies and Levels of Organization 
There are five main federal fire agencies that fall under the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) or the Department of the Interior (DOI) that have functions related to 
wildland fire management: The United States Forest Service (USFS), the National Park Service 
(NPS), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Each of these agencies is tasked with 
different missions regarding land management, but all five of these agencies overlap when 
considering wildland fire management specifically.  
The Forest Service is responsible for managing some of the largest contiguous stretches 
of public land and has a stated intent of providing public lands for the use and enjoyment of 
patrons while also allowing for the use of resources for private industry 
(http://www.fs.fed.us/about-agency/what-we-believe, accessed 04/01/2016). The Bureau of Land 
Management has a similarly stated mission and the most land of any of the five agencies, but the 
majority is not contiguous. In addition, the land is less often used for recreation and more often 
used for resource extraction (http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/About_BLM.html, accessed 
04/01/2016). On the other end of the spectrum, the National Park Service is responsible for 
preserving public lands at designated National Parks and that are used solely for recreation; 
however National Park Service holdings accounts for a small amount of federal public lands 
(https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/index.htm, accessed 04/01/2016). The United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service is somewhat similar to the National Park Service in that they are tasked with 
preserving National Wildlife Refuges in order to protect native wildlife species, and while they 
also do not possess as much land as the Forest Service or BLM, they are not as restrictive about 
resource use as the NPS (http://www.fws.gov/info/pocketguide/fundamentals.html, accessed 
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04/01/2016). Finally, the Bureau of Indian Affairs is responsible for managing lands that are 
associated with Indian Tribes and possesses the least amount of public lands of any of the five 
agencies (http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/, Accessed 04/01/2016). 
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, geography is often concerned with scale, with scale 
being a useful concept to characterize either the size or the level of a specific issue in reference 
to spatial processes. When considering scale in relation to level, these five land management 
agencies have several scales of organizational management. Each of the five land management 
agencies cooperate on many issues related to wildland fire management, but have many tasks 
they handle individually as agencies outside of fire management. When the five agencies are 
coordinating standardized procedures as a group while managing wildfires, this could be said to 
be at the scale of the fire service. When performing the disparate tasks associated with each 
agency, this could be considered as the individual agency scale. Still more refined is the regional 
scale within each agency, as each of the five federal land management agencies has specific 
regions within its respective organization. From here, scales could be more refined to include 
work stations, crews, or even the scale of the individual body – however this project will only 






It is important to note, however, that these scales are not natural or predetermined, but are 
socially constructed. This is an imperative point to make because once an organizational scale 
has been defined, policies that are used for organizational management at these respective scales 
may change when moving up or down the hierarchy displayed above. Even more important, 
these policies must be enacted in specific places and may not be standardized among all five land 
management agencies, or even among regions within individual agencies. To visually 







Map 3.1 – USDA Forest Service 
 








Map 3.3 – DOI – Bureau of Indian Affairs 
 





Map 3.5 – DOI – Fish and Wildlife Service 
 
As can be seen, each of these agencies defines space in different ways. That means that 
the policies of individual agencies may not only differ from one another, but regions within 
individual agencies may even possess different policies that only apply within those geographic 
boundaries. In this situation, socially constructed scales of organizational management have 
created a situation where the policies corresponding with a specific scale may be incongruent 
among the agencies. Because each of these agencies have very different overall land 
management functions, it is no surprise they define scales and space differently. When 
considering that all of these agencies must coordinate in regards to fire management, however, 
the incongruence of certain policies that are not standardized can cause conflictions of policy 
among and within these agencies. 
Due to the different missions of each agency, coordination can be difficult when there are 
high volumes of wildfire. In order to standardize fire related objectives and procedures, the 
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Department of the Interior and the Forest Service jointly created a single document that all five 
agencies are required to follow: Guidance for the Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire 
Management Policy. This document establishes a means of interagency cooperation when 
managing a multi-jurisdictional incident that impacts various governmental scales and the public 
and is intended to be “intergovernmental in scope” (p. 7). This agreement was first created in 
1995 and was updated for clarification in 2001 and 2009. The original 1995 document covers 
five primary aspects of fire management, most of which still set the management precedent for 
federal fire agencies today: “Role of wildland fire in resource management, use of wildland fire, 
preparedness and suppression, wildland/urban interface protection, and coordinated program 
management.” This document sets a precedent for how wildfire management policy is created. 
Aside from this overarching policy document, fire agencies must standardize other 
features of wildfire management in order to cooperate efficiently with other agencies. While 
scale is a useful concept for understanding different levels of organization, it is also useful for 
designating different sizes. One of the most basic standard features of wildfire management is 
the designation of wildfires as either large scale or small scale. These designation come from the 
National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG), an agency tasked with standardizing aspects of 
fire management so various jurisdictional actors within and outside of the federal government 
can coordinate fire related initiatives. By utilizing standard references to either “large” or “small” 
wildfire scales, agencies can implement standardized policies which apply to both of these 
scales. Section 3.2 discusses how scales are designated from an administrative standpoint. 
Section 3.2 – Administrative Designations of Incident Size  
To determine the scale of an incident as large or small, all wildfire incidents must be 
designated by “Type,” which can range from a scale of 1-5, with Type 1 fires being the largest 
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and Type 5 fires being the smallest. Incident Types are dictated by the National Wildfire 
Coordinating Group (NWCG). Designations of scale are based on factors related to the number 
of resources required to address the incident and the duration of the incident – both factors that 
impact the geographic extent of the fire. This project will employ official terminology to 
distinguish between large and small scale incidents. 
Section 3.2 – A – Small scale fires. The smallest incidents, designated as “Type 4-5” 
incidents, are also referred to as “Initial Attack” fires. These are generally smaller, more benign 
incidents that do not require more than a few operational shifts to contain and control. The 
NWCG defines an Initial Attack fire as: 
the action taken by resources that are first to arrive at an incident. All wildland fires that 
are controlled by suppression forces undergo initial attack. The kind and number of 
resources responding to initial attack varies depending upon fire danger, fuel type, values 
to be protected, and other factors. Generally, initial attack involves a small number of 
resources, and incident size is small. Regardless of fire type, location, or 
property/resource being threatened, firefighter safety will always be the #1 priority. 
NWCG Fireline Handbook, 2004, p.79 
 
As can be seen, the designation of small fires is based on the number of resources required to 
address the incident and the amount of time it will take to control the incident – both factors that 
are related to the geographic extent of the fire. The number of resources assumed to be needed to 
address an incident are largely based off of how active the fire is and what is threatened if the 
fire grows larger. Along with the perceived number of resources, incident complexity is 
impacted by the perceived risk that firefighters would have to undertake in order to engage the 
fire. Even if a fire is small and not very active, an incident may progress in complexity if it 
presents great risks to firefighters who attempt to extinguish it. Conversely, a quick burning grass 
fire may impact dozens of acres only to be stopped suddenly by a road or lake where the fuels 
dissipate, thus not requiring many firefighting resources. With this in mind, the definition of 
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large and small fires is not explicitly based on geographic extent, but small fires generally impact 
a smaller geographic area than large fires – small scale fires do not last very long, so they do not 
have as much time to impact large geographic areas. Firefighters and the incident command staff 
on the scene of a wildfire will ultimately make the determination that the fire is manageable for 
the resources present, or decide that more resources are needed to address potential fire growth. 
Once a fire begins to exceed the perceived capacity of firefighting resources, the incident will 
transition from a small to a large fire. 
Section 3.2 – B – Transitioning from small to large. When small fires get larger and 
cannot be contained, Incident command Staff must upgrade the fire type and call in more 
resources to deal with the incident. This phase is known as “Transfer of Command” and is 
considered to be a highly dangerous time for firefighters on the line because there is a short time 
period where the next person in charge, or “Incident Commander,” must get briefed on what is 
happening and be brought up to speed all while the fire is still burning and firefighters are still 
engaged. The NWCG fireline handbook notes that: 
Many safety problems emerge as an incident becomes larger and/or more complex. 
Incident transfer of command historically has been one of the most dangerous phases of 
incident management. Incidents should transfer command at a specific time, preferably at 
the start of a new operational period. The operational effort should continue during 
transfer period with command and control of the incident firmly in place, and with clear, 
achievable and sound strategy and tactics communicating to and implemented by all 
firefighting resources. NWCG Fireline Handbook, 2004, p. 125 
 
It is not so much the complexity of the incident itself that proves dangerous to firefighters so 
much as the difficulty of implementing a smooth transfer of command as the incident becomes 
more complex by becoming larger in size. Many of the same hazards exist at both large and 
small scales of incident management, but transfer of command is particularly dangerous because 
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there may not be clear operational intent directed to firefighters during the transition phase. As 
an incident becomes more complex, it transitions into a larger Type 1-3 fire. 
Section 3.2 – C – Large scale fires. From an administrative standpoint, Type 1-3 fires 
are considered “Extended Attack Incidents” and must meet several stipulations to qualify as a 
large incident. The designation of a large incident has to do with the perception of the number of 
people required to manage the incident and the duration of the incident, as it is with small fires. 
According to the NWCG Fireline Handbook, the following list describes characteristics of large 
scale wildfire management: 
- Supervision for a large organization 
- Multiple operational periods to contain fire 
- Providing logistical support including the establishment and operation of a base and 
possibly camps 
- Supervisors that are qualified to manage Type 1-3 fires 
- Multiple divisions to manage different parts of a large fire, requiring multiple branches to 
be activated to address span-of-control needs 
- Operations personnel often exceed 500 per operational period and total persons on the 
incident usually exceeds 1000 
- Aviation operations often involve several types and numbers of aircraft (NWCG Fireline 
Handbook, 2004, p. 109, 119). 
 
Fires are designated as large not just because they may involve many acres, but because the 
“values at risk” in that particular area, such as human developments or large populations of 
people, warrant the use of a large number of resources. Though the fire activity may be greater 
on large fires, there are more resources available to deal with those complexities. In this case, 
large fires require many firefighters (potentially thousands) over a time period of weeks or 
months. Though there is not a specific geographic criterion to designate a fire as large scale, 
large fires generally burn heavy fuels such as old growth trees over a long time period, and as a 
result also impact a substantial geographic region. The range in sizes of wildfires can be as small 
as a single flaming tree struck by lightning to many hundreds of square miles impacted by a fire 
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– because of this, it is difficult to put a specific number on the spatial area a fire must impact to 
be designated as a certain size, but the variation in size between what is considered small or large 
is nonetheless tied directly to the size of the geographic area that is impacted. 
Section 3.2 – D – How scale is determined. Because much of what could be considered 
“complex” may be different for different firefighters, much of the construction of scale regarding 
the type of fire a specific incident is designated as is subjective to the individual firefighters on 
scene. The language regarding incident complexity has to do with number of resources perceived 
to be needed over the duration of the fire – both factors that are determined based off of the 
geographic extent of the fire. Large fires require many resources over a long period, and 
generally impact a large geographic area – small fires require few resources in a short period of 
time and generally do not have substantial geographic impacts. The designations of scale and the 





These designations are significant within the context of policy creation for reasons 
mentioned by Birkland (2006) and others. Because the most visceral focusing events tend to 
attract the most attention, it is common for the largest, worst-case scenario wildfire focusing 
events to garner the most attention during windows of opportunity. The next section will discuss 
historical events that attracted substantial attention and led to major fire management and 
firefighter safety policy changes. 
Section 3.3 – Historical Safety Policy Events  
 In order to understand how policy production occurs among federal land management 
agencies, it is important to have a historical background on how policies have evolved 
throughout the history of fire management. In the first century of American history, the federal 
government oversaw lands for the purpose of disposing of them to private individuals (Loomis, 
2002). As the original 13 colonies grew and the newly founded nation began to press westward, 
the federal government did all they could to provide incentives to individuals to establish 
themselves in the Western States (Loomis, 2002). The most significant piece of legislation to 
promote westward expansion came under President Abraham Lincoln, who in 1862 signed the 
Homestead Act into law, which incentivized settlers to move west by offering 160 acres of land 
to any takers (Loomis, 2002). The objective of government to give land away set the tone for the 
first century of public lands management. It was not until the end of the 19th century that the 
federal government would begin to take a new approach. 
Section 3.3 – A – The Beginning of Fire Management. While there are many 
significant events that could be pointed to when discussing the historical evolution of federal 
public lands in the United States, perhaps the most important example is the Forest Reserve Act 
of 1891 (Hudson, 2011). Created under President Harrison, this act established 13 million acres 
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as “forest reserves” that the government set aside for the public, and also allowed for future 
presidents to set aside similar reserves (Hudson, 2011). In 1905, the lands established under this 
act were transferred to the newly created Forest Service under President Theodore Roosevelt, 
where the majority of public lands were in the Western United States in places that had not been 
developed for communities or resource extraction (Egan, 2007). While this was a historic event 
within the history of federal land management, it did not go uncontested. From the beginning, 
private mining, logging, and railroad companies fought Roosevelt bitterly for the right to use and 
exploit the lands as they saw fit (Egan, 2007). Using western newspapers to circulate propaganda 
about individual rights and land ownership, these private sector interests nearly won out by 
convincing local residents that the government was only trying to take the land so it could 
intrude on individual liberties.  
Wealthy private interests may have won had it not been for a tragic and societally altering 
event, the fires of 1910. Dubbed “the Big Burn.” These fires burned over 3 million acres in the 
Northwest United states and killed 79 firefighters (Egan, 2007). Because residents of western 
towns were worried forests would burn again and cause another devastating event, they saw the 
need for the newly formed Forest Service as an agency that would protect the public from fire. In 
the beginning, the Forest Service was created with a utilitarian mission in mind – “the greatest 
good for the greatest number” – and was intended to be used cooperatively between members of 
the public for recreation and homesteading or by the private sector for resource development 
(Hudson, 2011). This mission, created by Forest Service chief Gifford Pinchot, was intended to 
“conserve” resources while still allowing different groups of people to use the land as they saw 
fit. The only way to accomplish this mission, in the eyes of the newly formed Forest Service, was 
to exclude fire from Western landscapes. This was officially done in 1935 with the creation of 
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the “10 A.M.” wildfire suppression policy, which required all fires to be extinguished by 10 
A.M. the morning after they were discovered. This policy was heavily influenced by the 
precedent set by the Forest Service following the fires of 1910. This event was significant 
because it set the stage for political learning that would dominate the way future fire 
management and firefighter safety policies would be created. 
Section 3.3 – B – The middle period of fire management. The 10 A.M. suppression 
policy was partially designed with safety in mind so that firefighters could keep the public safe 
by eliminating large fires in areas where they might normally burn. As time went on, it became 
clear that not all fires could be contained and that some would inevitably grow into large fires. 
Following the creation of the 10 A.M. policy, several tragic events occurred that signaled to the 
Forest Service that it would not be possible to keep all fires small, and that when fires did get 
large, they posed a significant threat to the firefighters managing those fires. One of the most 
significant events to occur that signaled the need for the first firefighter safety policy came in 
1949 as a result of the “Mann Gulch Fire” in Montana.  
In this event, a crew of elite Smokejumpers – firefighters who travel by plane and 
parachute near fires – were sent to a fire outside of Helena, Montana, where they began 
suppressing a wildfire that was quickly spreading. As a result of topographic factors and weather 
conditions, the fire blew out of control. The firefighters attempted to escape the blazes, and while 
some made it out, 13 were overtaken by the fire and killed (Maclean, 1992). This event is 
perhaps the most iconic tragedy that contributed to the creation of the first comprehensive safety 
policy — the 10 Standard Fire Orders and the 18 Watchout Situations. Created in 1957, these 
were based on military standard orders and were created to help alert firefighters to common 
dangers on the fireline. The 10 Standard Fire Orders were protocols that would help firefighters 
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prevent accidents from happening, with orders that stated firefighters must “Stay informed on 
fire weather conditions and forecasts” and to “Post lookouts where there is possible danger,” 
among others (IRPG). The 18 Watchout Situations alerted firefighters to common dangers that 
could lead to a deadly situation, such as “Weather becoming hotter and drier,” or “Terrain and 
fuels which make escape to safety zones difficult” (IRPG). These updated protocols were 
significant because it was the first time federal fire management agencies recognized the need to 
maintain the safety of their employees in order to fulfil the overall agency objective of 
suppressing all fires. The creation of this policy essentially signaled that rather than rethink the 
overall strategy of aggressive fire suppression, they would instead find ways for firefighters to 
attack all fires, but in a supposedly safer way. Often referred to as the 10 & 18, these protocols 
are still standard training for all firefighters today. 
The 10 Standard Fire Orders and 18 Watchout situations helped to set the precedent for 
how safety policies would be created. After the creation of this policy, other tragic events 
occurred that prompted federal fire agencies to respond to safety issues in a similar manner that 
allowed for the overall mission of suppressing wildfires to be maintained. The logic behind the 
10 A.M. suppression policy was not questioned until the 1970’s when researchers on wildfire 
realized that suppressing fire meant that hazardous fuels would accumulate and eventually lead 
to much larger, more devastating fires (Bradshaw and Lueck, 2012). Though the 10 A.M. policy 
was officially replaced with less aggressive policies in 1978, the damage had been done 
(Bradshaw and Lueck, 2012). Not only did fire suppression lead to a buildup of fuels, it also 
allowed for developers to build homes and towns in areas that were prone to regular wildfire 
disturbance because fires were artificially removed (Bradshaw and Lueck). Even though there 
had been a recognition that the old policies were creating larger problems down the line, after 
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enough time had passed, fire management agencies had little choice but to continue suppressing 
most wildfires, even though the formal 10 A.M. suppression policy had been replaced because 
members of the public still needed protection. In this way, the 10 A.M. policy continued to 
influence firefighter safety well after it was established and repealed. 
Section 3.3 – C – Contemporary fire management. These factors influenced the 
complexity of the bio-physical wildland fire environment, the ways federal fire agencies would 
approach fire management, and the safety hazards that firefighters faced. After the first formal 
safety policy had been created through the 10 Standard Fire Orders and 18 Watchout Situations, 
other firefighter tragedies would occur that similarly influenced updated safety policies and 
maintained the overall aggressive approach of fire management. Though many iconic events that 
influenced policy could be discussed, one of the most publicized events occurred in 1994 on the 
South Canyon Fire. In this event, 14 firefighters were killed on Storm King Mountain in 
Colorado on a fire that went from small and relatively benign to a massive conflagration in a 
single afternoon, which occurred in close proximity to populated areas near Glenwood Springs, 
Colorado.  
Though many factors were cited leading up to the tragedy, two significant factors were 
identified; the most up to date fire weather reports were not disseminated to everyone who 
needed them; firefighters on the front lines had a lack of radios, and therefore an inability to 
communicate with the incident command staff in charge of the fire (MaClean, 1999). As a result, 
fire management agencies recognized that there needed to be more substantive materials 
provided to firefighters to help them control and manage fires in a safer way. This was 
accomplished by providing firefighters with more training on fire weather conditions and 
providing them with the most up to date weather information. Additionally, there was a greater 
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emphasis placed on providing communications devices to firefighters on the line. This event was 
significant because it signaled to fire agencies that more needed to be done to allow firefighters 
to protect themselves and the public. Because the management approach to controlling this 
particular fire was partly based on the fact that there was a nearby community, fire agencies 
realized they would need to provide their employees with better equipment to allow them to do 
their jobs and continue to exclude fires from places where it could impact members of the public. 
Since this tragedy, more safety policies have been created to protect the firefighters who 
are protecting the public. Though today the 10 A.M. suppression policy is almost universally 
recognized as having been a failure, the impacts of fuel loading and allowing developments to 
occur in the Wildland-Urban Interface cannot be undone. As a result, fire management agencies 
are having to play catch-up with both management and firefighter safety policies. Though there 
is a recognition that all out suppression puts off the problem of wildfire for the future, it is 
incredibly difficult to allow natural fire disturbances to occur in populated areas. As a result, fire 
management agencies are forced to continue the aggressive approach to managing wildfire, 
especially if they grow large or if they threaten populated areas. In the present day, firefighter 
safety policy is in many ways continuing to evolve such that attempts to mitigate safety concerns 
still promote firefighters to aggressively engage fires.  
One of the most significant safety concerns for federal firefighters comes not as a result 
of the fire itself, but as a result of medical emergencies that can occur on fires. Unlike many 
structure firefighters working for municipal departments who receive substantial training related 
to emergency medical response, wildland firefighters working for the federal government receive 
very little medical training. This leaves them particularly vulnerable if a medical emergency 
occurs in a remote area where rapid treatment and transport are difficult. A recent firefighter 
52 
 
tragedy that assisted in exposing these issues occurred in 2008 on the Eagle Fire in Northern 
California. On July 25, 2008, a crew of firefighters was assigned to a benign part of the fire to 
fell hazardous trees. During this assignment, one of the firefighters, 18 year old Andrew Palmer 
was struck by a tree. The tree broke his left femur, and because the crew was in a remote area, he 
had no one but his crewmembers to attend to his injuries until they could get him to an area that 
was accessible to emergency medical professionals. While there were many factors leading up to 
the accident, one of the most significant factors was a delayed response time – partly caused 
because his injury was identified and relayed as a broken leg, not a broken femur (Dutch Creek 
Accident Investigation, 2008). While a broken leg is no minor injury, a broken femur is 
potentially life-threatening because it can rupture the femoral artery and lead to death by internal 
bleeding in a short period of time. In this case, Palmer’s injuries were not attended to fast enough 
and he passed away on the flight to the hospital (Dutch Creek Accident Investigation, 2008).  
This incident was significant because it prompted federal fire agencies to consider the 
issue of emergency medical response for the first time and led to the production of the first 
comprehensive medical response policy for federal firefighters. The goal of updated policies was 
to find ways to either mitigate medical emergencies from happening in the first place, or to 
reduce response times to injured firefighters once something had happened, rather than bolster 
the amount of medical training provided to firefighters so they could begin to address medical 
issues themselves. While the provision of emergency medical training for firefighters may seem 
like an obvious way to better provide for firefighter safety, there are several important 
considerations that prevent this from happening. Before moving on, Table 3.1 below summarizes 
the main points from this section. The next section will discuss the legal and jurisdictional 





Section 3.4 – Emergency Medical Response in the Federal Wildland Fire Service  
The Eagle fire and the Dutch Creek Accident Investigation were significant events within 
the context of federal firefighter safety policy because it was the first time a focusing event put a 
light on emergency medical response for federal wildland firefighters. One of the largest 
shortcomings within the realm of federal firefighter safety is a lack of medical training provided 
to firefighters. The only standardized training provided to all federal wildland firefighters is a 16 
hour-long First Aid/CPR class. Because firefighters often respond to remote incidents where 
emergency medical providers would have a difficult time accessing, the lack of medical training 
provided to federal wildland firefighters is one of the single largest shortcomings related to 
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firefighter safety. This is not intentional on behalf of fire management agencies, but rather, 
several factors exist that have caused this situation to exist as such.  
Section 3.4 – A – Guidance for the Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire 
Management Policy. As mentioned earlier, the Guidance for the Implementation of Federal 
Wildland Fire Management Policy is the main guiding doctrine regarding wildfire management 
policies. Because different agencies may have varying policies regarding natural resource 
management in general in regards to their land, it is necessary to standardize response to 
wildfire. This document, from a policy perspective, sets the precedent for all fire management 
activities at the federal level. In the executive summary, the first guiding principle for fire 
management policy states: 
Protection of human life as the first priority in wildland fire management. Property and 
natural/cultural resources jointly become the second priority, with protection decisions 
based on values to be protected and other considerations. 
 
The 2009 updates include additional language: 
 
No natural or cultural resource, home, or item of property is worth a human life. All 
strategies and tactics should seek to mitigate the risk to firefighters and the public. 
Agency administrators will develop and establish process, procedures and objectives that 
ensure firefighter safety. Incident Commanders will develop and establish incident 
objectives, strategies and operational tactics that ensure firefighter and public safety. 
 
The document reiterates points about “firefighter and public safety” multiple times throughout, 
seemingly setting a clear precedent for human health and well-being in regards to fire 
management. Though the term “safety” is repeated many times as a primary goal, there are 
ultimately no specifics about how safety will be accounted for. While the Guidance for the 
Implementation of federal Wildland Fire Management Policy standardizes many fire 
management activities among federal agencies, there is one critical piece related to safety that is 
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in no way addressed within this document: the role of medical training and emergency medical 
response for federal firefighters.  
Section 3.4 – B – Legal underpinnings to emergency medical protocols among 
federal agencies. The reason this seemingly obvious safety concern is not addressed is because 
medical policy, unlike virtually every other aspect of federal wildland fire management, is not 
standardized among the five federal land management agencies in terms of what it covers, who it 
covers, or where it covers agency employees. Every agency approaches the subject of medical 
training and qualifications differently, meaning that some firefighters working for one agency 
may receive more or less medical training than firefighters working for a different agency. 
Though some agencies may provide more training than others, there is no federal fire agency that 
has federally endorsed and qualified emergency medical providers, such as paramedics. When 
considering the policies in place that govern these types of issues, there is scant direction 
provided to policy makers in regards to the amount of medical training employees are required to 
receive. Currently, there are only imprecise standards set for all federal employees, and for 
federal firefighters more specifically. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) states in the General Duty Clause, Section 5, which all federal agencies must follow, 
that:  
“Each employer:  
1) Shall furnish to each of his employees employment and place of employment 
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause 
death or serious physical harm to his employees; 
2) Shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated 
under this act” (OSHA, 1970). 
Additionally, and specifically for federal firefighters, the Wildland Fire and Aviation Handbook 
states: 
“In the absence of an infirmary, clinic, or hospital in near proximity to the workplace 
which is used for the treatment of all injured employees, a person or persons shall be 
adequately trained to render first aid. Adequate first aid supplies shall be readily 




Beyond these two vague requirements, no guiding doctrine exists to address the subject of 
medical training for federal wildland firefighters. The only training that is provided as a standard 
among all five agencies is a 16 hour long First Aid/CPR class, and the only medical supplies 
made available as a standard are the “10 person First Aid kits,” which simply contain small 
bandages and basic medical supplies (Wildland fire and aviation handbook). While many 
wildland firefighters may possess qualifications beyond First Aid/CPR, such as qualification as 
an Emergency Medical Technician, they would have had to acquire these on their own time and 
money, or have their local district provide it for them – in other words, it is not standardized 
among all federal fire agencies. Additionally, critical pieces of safety equipment such as 
stabilizing backboards or splints for fractures are not provided unless local duty stations 
prioritize their limited budgets to include these materials – again, something that must be done 
by individuals but is not standardized federally. 
 While this lack of guidance regarding a topic that is very obviously related to employee 
safety may seem negligent, there are many underlying legal, political and jurisdictional factors 
that make implementing standardized medical training beyond First Aid/CPR very difficult. Part 
of the reason that First Aid/CPR is used as training is because it is so general that it is not 
considered “advanced” from a legal perspective. More in-depth training would qualify one as an 
“Emergency Medical Provider” such as an Emergency Medical Technician or an Advanced Life 
Support Paramedic. These qualifications are considered advanced training and as a result require 
authority in specific jurisdictions in order to legally operate as an emergency medical provider, 
much like medical doctors who must receive specific state based authorizations to practice in a 
particular state. Typically, advanced training certification is issued and licensed at the state level, 
meaning that if one is qualified as an Emergency Medical Provider in one state, he or she can 
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only legally practice in that state and no other, unless ones goes on to acquire the same 
qualifications in multiple states. In order to legally operate once one receives these 
qualifications, they must work for an organization that provides “medical direction”—which 
means there is an on-call doctor who will vouch for an individual as competent and qualified to 
work on patients, and also provide off-site direction to the emergency medical provider should 
they need it (https://www.acep.org/Clinical---Practice-Management/Medical-Direction-of-
Emergency-Medical-Services/, accessed 04/01/2016). Without jurisdictional authority or a 
medical director, one cannot legally operate as an emergency medical provider. These points are 
summarized in Figure 3.4 below: 
Figure 3.4 
 
It is well known by nearly all people involved in federal fire management that there is 
limited medical training to firefighters, but it is also understood that legal and political barriers 
exist externally of federal fire management agencies that spatially prevent firefighters from 
operating in multiple states with advanced training. This is not a problem for the majority of 
federal, state, or municipal agencies because there are few circumstances where first responders 
would need to practice emergency medicine in multiple states. Because the fire environment is 
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changing and becoming more complex, federal firefighters will be faced with more hazards and 
the issue of emergency medical response will become a more important factor when considering 
the safety of firefighters. 
Section 3.5 – Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed background aspects of fie management in the United States. 
The five federal land management agencies tasked with managing wildfire must find ways to 
coordinate to manage fire cooperatively. One such way of standardizing operations is through the 
designation of large and small wildfire incident scales. As will be shown in future chapters, the 
designation of either large or small wildfire incidents can directly enable or constrain firefighter 
responses to safety hazards when operating at these respective scales. This chapter also briefly 
discussed several major historical events that have shaped wildfire management over time. As 
was discussed by Birkland (2006), the largest focusing events tend to garner the most attention 
during windows of opportunity – a situation which is similarly reflected when discussing the 
history of federal wildland fire and safety management, where visceral worst-case-scenario 
events served as punctuations that were followed by policy change. One of the more recent 
tragedies to inspire policy change came out of the Eagle Fire, where fire management agencies 
took action to address the issue of emergency medical response for the first time. While it may 
come as a surprise that federal wildland firefighters receive very little standardized medical 
training, there are several legal and jurisdictional underpinnings which have influenced this 
situation. Now that a background of these issues has been discussed, I will move forward to 
demonstrate the methodological approach that will be taken to investigate my research question: 
How are reactive and proactive approaches to federal firefighter safety policy creation produced, 
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applied, and circulated to address safety issues related to emergency medical response on both 
large and small scale wildfires and at different levels of organizational management. 
Chapter 4: Methodology – Policy Analysis 
 I approach my investigation of firefighter safety policy using a detailed policy analysis. 
In Section 4.1, the research design will be based on the comparison of proactive and reactive 
approaches to policy production to evaluate which approach works best for addressing safety 
hazards on both large and small scale wildfire incidents. A policy analysis will be useful in this 
context because it provides a systematic means of comparing two different approaches to policy 
production. In Section 4.2 I will discuss how I will conduct this analysis using Bardach’s 
template in his 1996 book, The Eight-Step Path of Policy Analysis, because it is applicable for 
both academics and policy makers attempting to investigate real world issues. Following this 
eight-step path in Section 4.3, I will analyze reactive and proactive approaches to policy 
production – reactive approaches will be evaluated using four historical events that characterize 
how safety policy has been created over time for all federal fire agencies, and proactive 
approaches will be evaluated using two recent examples of policy change that occurred within 
individual agencies but not federally. Specifically, the recent examples under consideration apply 
to emergency medical response for firefighters. In Section 4.4, I will discuss my positionality as 
a researcher. As a former firefighter who has worked within the framework of many of the 
policies under consideration, my positionality must be made fully transparent. Finally, in section 
4.5, I will discuss the limitations of this study. 
 Policy analysis is an appropriate methodological approach to address issues related to the 
production of policy, which in this case asks the question: How are reactive and proactive 
approaches to federal firefighter safety policy production produced, applied, and circulated to 
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address safety issues related to emergency medical response on both large and small scale 
wildfires? As was shown in the Research Context Chapter, this project will utilize literature 
relevant to Birkland’s 2006 concept of focusing events, literature on Science and Technology 
Studies, and geographic literature related to the social construction of scale. Birkland’s concept 
of focusing events helps to demonstrate how firefighter safety policy has reactively evolved over 
time, and his suggestions of proactive approaches to policy production reflect two recent policy 
changes that have occurred within federal agencies but not standardized for all federal fire 
management agencies. The STS literature discussed will inform the evaluative criteria used to 
analyze both reactive and proactive approaches to policy production by considering how safety 
information was produced, applied to specific policies, and circulated to firefighters over space. 
Finally, literature related to the social construction of scale sets up a theoretical point of 
comparison that considers the material effects of administrative designations of large vs. small 
scales and how those designations may either enable or constrain firefighter’s responses to 
medical emergencies.  
Section 4.1 -- Research Design – Case Studies of Reactive and Proactive Approaches to 
Policy Production 
To expand from Birkland’s insights about reactive policy production and demonstrate 
how windows of opportunity influence the creation of firefighter safety policy through political 
learning, I will discuss four major safety policy changes that have occurred throughout the 
history of wildfire management in the United States. Each event represents how policies have 
changed in response to focusing events during the beginning, middle, and contemporary periods 
of wildfire management. These periods correspond with the beginning of formal fire 
management with the creation of the Forest Service in 1905, the middle period extending into the 
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middle of the 20th century, and the contemporary period corresponding with the present day. 
While more or other events could have been selected to represent the evolution of firefighter 
safety policy, the following events were selected because they are some of the most well 
documented wildfire tragedies to occur throughout history. The events selected will include the 
Fires of 1910, the Mann Gulch Fire (1949), the South Canyon Fire (1994), and the Eagle Fire 
(2008). All four of these events are consistent with the concept of policy change following a 
focusing event, and in these cases, all occurred on large fires during worst-case-scenario events.   
The reactive approach to policy production following political learning and has 
characterized the evolution of firefighter safety policy in the U.S. will be compared with the 
proactive approach to policy production that utilizes social learning that was described by 
Birkland in my Research Context Chapter. To do this, I will utilize two recent examples of 
policy changes that have occurred within individual agencies but have not been standardized for 
all federal fire management agencies. These examples will include the Forest Service Region 4 
6725 Emergency Medical Services and the Bureau of Indian Affairs First Aid Project. While 
there may be other similar examples existing within federal fire management agencies that could 
have been used, these two are the most recent and adequately demonstrate an alternative to the 
traditional reactive process of policy production that remains to be the dominant form of 
comprehensive policy production that may not favor specific scales of wildfire management. 
The methodological approach for this project will be a qualitative policy document 
analysis. I will discuss the criteria that were utilized in order to allow for repeatable testing. This 
project will operationalize insights from STS scholars who have analyzed the policy production 
process. Goldman’s phases of policy production will be used as evaluative criteria upon which 
this policy analysis will be based, and consider: 
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 How was new safety knowledge produced following a tragic incident? 
 How was that knowledge applied to a specific policy? 
 How was that policy circulated over space to affected individuals? 
 
As will be shown, this STS approach to policy analysis fits nicely within Bardach’s 2006 process 
by identifying specific evaluative criteria upon which proactive and reactive approaches to policy 




Section 4.2 – Why policy analysis 
 Policy analysis is useful within the context of this research because it offers a 
methodological approach for addressing a particular policy problem; in this case, reactive and 
proactive approaches to the creation of safety policies that are intended to apply universally to 
large and small scale wildfires that may actually fall short. While my project will utilize 
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Bardach’s process, there are other approaches to policy analysis. Weimer and Vining have 
written four editions of their 1996 book Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice, where they 
detail the process of policy analysis for both students and practitioners. As some of the first to 
create a methodological approach to policy analysis, Weimer and Vining identified three major 
aspects that should be considered: a description of what policy analysis is and the contexts in 
which it is useful, a description of how to methodologically approach a policy analysis, and the 
ways policy analysis can be applied to specific problems (Weimer and Vining, 1999, p. vii). 
Nagel has also discussed approaches to policy analysis and helps to define differences between 
“policy analysis” and “policy evaluation” when he says “policy analysis is understood to be shot 
through with value conflicts, political decisions and priorities, but evaluation is typically seen as 
the application of relatively neutral, social scientific research techniques to policy issues” (Nagel, 
1999, p. 2). With this in mind, my project will follow an analysis rather than an evaluation. 
Though the approaches offered by these individuals are certainly worthy for conducting 
policy analysis, I will follow Bardach’s process to methodologically approach my project. 
Bardach’s Eight-Step Path consists of: 
- Defining the problem 
- Assembling evidence 
- Constructing the alternatives 
- Selecting criteria 
- Projecting outcomes 
- Confronting tradeoffs 
- Deciding 
- Telling a story 
Bardach’s process fits well with my investigation because it is a simple and straightforward 
process that is relevant to real world policy problems. The Eight-Step Path is flexible across the 
domains of geographic and planning literature and consists of a logical flow that could be 
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repeated by others attempting to replicate my study. Now that Bardach’s process has been 
introduced, I will discuss how each step will be approached for my project. 
Section 4.3 – Bardach’s 8 Steps 
Step 1: The first step in Bardach’s policy analysis is to “Define the Problem.” According to 
Bardach, this critical step frames the problem under consideration and provides a roadmap for 
how the policy will be analyzed with evidence. This project considers how anthropogenic factors 
that are exacerbating wildfire seasons will magnify shortcomings in the traditional policy making 
process that is focused on worst-case-scenario events occurring on large scale wildfire incidents. 
Under particular consideration is the current policy framework related to emergency medical 
response on wildfires.  
Step 2: The second step is to “Assemble Evidence.” According to Bardach, this part of the 
process requires critically thinking about and analyzing the problem. Why does the research 
question matter? What evidence is needed to address the research question? In this study, I will 
focus on reactive and proactive approaches to safety policy production. Reactive approaches that 
utilize political learning will be evaluated using the four historical cases, which will include:  the 
Fires of 1910, the Mann Gulch Fire (1949), the South Canyon Fire (1994), and the Eagle Fire 
(2008). Proactive approaches that utilize social learning will be evaluated using two 
contemporary examples of policy changes that occurred within individual agencies but not 
federal wide, and will include the Forest Service 6725 Emergency Medical Services and the 






To evaluate reactive approaches based on the four historical examples, I will use factual 
information regarding these events that will come from federal agencies involved with wildland 
fire management. To inform the criteria of production, application, circulation, I will use formal 
accident investigations and safety statistics that will be collected from three of the largest and 
most influential groups responsible for compiling safety data for federal wildland firefighters; the 
National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG), the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) 
and the Lessons Learned Center (LLC). The NWCG sets many of the standards among federal, 
state, and municipal agencies tasked with managing wildfire and collects safety statistics for all 
firefighters involved with wildfire management. They are also often involved in the process of 
investigating tragic incidents and possess databases for searching accident investigations. The 
NIFC is a group that coordinates among various federal agencies that are involved with fire 
management either directly or indirectly. It also possesses statistics on firefighter safety, 
including detailed historical data on federal firefighter fatalities over time. Finally, the Lessons 
Learned Center is tasked with compiling data from the NWCG and the NIFC in order to create 
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safety reports that can be made accessible to firefighters on the ground. The Lessons Learned 
Center has a substantial database on both accident investigations and firefighter safety statistics 
for federal firefighters and will serve as a primary source for information about federal firefighter 
safety for this project. 
To evaluate proactive responses to policy production based on the two recent examples of 
agency policy that have been selected, I will utilize information coming directly from these 
respective agency websites. The Forest Service Region 4 6725 Emergency Medical Services 
policy can be accessed via the Forest Service Region 4 website 
(http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/r4/fire-aviation?cid=stelprdb5375168). The Bureau of Indian 
Affairs First Aid Project policy can be accessed via the Bureau of Indian Affairs website 
(http://www.indianaffairs.gov/nifc/safety/firstresponder/index.htm).   
Step 3: The third step is to “Construct the Alternatives.” In this step, the specific plans that are 
intended to address the issue are considered. For this project, the alternative courses of action 
will be in reference to the way accident investigations are conducted. In this case, the traditional 
reactive approach that has characterized the evolution of safety policy and focuses on the 
response and recovery time periods of disaster management is being compared with a proactive 
approach which focuses on the preparedness and mitigation time periods. Though examples exist 
that display a proactive approach to policy production, they have not been standardized for all 
fire management agencies. Because the proactive approach has not been universally adopted, this 
will serve as the logical alternative to the reactive approach to policy production. 
I will also consider alternatives to the scales focused on during traditional accident 
investigations. The focus on worst-case-scenario accidents occurring on large fires would be 
logically juxtaposed by considering minor injuries that occur on small fires – something that is 
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not presently tracked by federal fire management agencies. At present, there is no mandate by 
federal fire agencies to track minor injuries, and as a result, there is no data available to inform 
policies to mitigate minor injuries. The designations of large or small scale incidents will be 
based on administratively determined levels of scale as either large or small scale incidents. 
Finally, I will apply STS approaches that consider the involvement of federal agencies 
responsible for creating policies and what information they tend to look for specifically. The 
groups that are tasked with collecting and compiling safety information have administrative 
guidelines that require them to focus on life threatening or fatal accidents that have occurred. 
This requirement shapes the types of information these groups may produce following an 
accident investigation. 
Step 4: The fourth step is to “Select the Criteria” that will be used to analyze the research 
question. Bardach states that criteria serve as “evaluative standards used to judge the goodness of 
the projected policy outcomes associated with each of the alternatives” (Bardach, 1996). The 
criteria will serve as the basis for measuring the alternatives that were discussed in Step 3. 
 The three criteria used to evaluate both reactive and proactive approaches to the creation 
of safety policy will be based on Goldman’s three phases of policy production and will include; 
How was knowledge produced regarding an accident; How was that knowledge applied to 
specific policies; and how were those policies circulated over space to affected individuals? 
Considering these three phases will serve as starting points of analysis. The knowledge 
production phase is important to consider because it helps to reveal the time periods in which the 
knowledge was created – preparedness/mitigation that occurs well before an issue arises, or the 
response/recovery phases which occur after an issue has arisen. In this case, the reactive 
approach is marked by accident investigations which tend to focus on worst-case-scenario 
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accidents occurring on large scales.. The proactive approach is marked by an inquiry into a 
potential problem and may or may not focus on worst-case-scenario issues occurring at specific 
scales. The production of knowledge becomes more important once the updated information is 
applied to a specific policy. If the knowledge informing policy updates disproportionately 
considers visceral accidents over minor injuries, the application of knowledge to policy will 
selectively favor policies that address visceral accidents rather than minor injuries. Finally, once 
knowledge is produced and applied to a specific policy, the ways in which those updates were 
circulated to affected individuals over space can enable or constrain firefighter responses to 
emergencies occurring at either large or small scales.. 
 The main case study under consideration will be the Eagle Fire, the most recent example 
of the four cases I have selected. Because this is the only example in existence of an accident that 
led to a major policy change to medical response protocol, this case will be the primary focus of 
this project. This policy, which was created under the traditional reactive approach to policy 
production, will be compared with other medical policies that have followed a proactive 
approach but are not standardized for all federal firefighters. Below is Figure 4.3 to demonstrate 
how I will use my criteria to perform a comparative analysis of reactive and proactive 
approaches to policy production and reveal which approach is most effective at addressing issues 











Step 5: The fifth step is to “Project the Outcomes” based on the alternatives that were discussed 
and the criteria that are being used to evaluate those alternatives. In this step, the alternatives will 
be evaluated based on the potential impacts corresponding policies may have. Though reasonable 
expectations can be made about the outcomes of potential alternatives, there are also aspects that 
cannot be foreseen that may not be presented here. In the context of this project, I will evaluate 
reactive and proactive approaches to policy production based on the criteria I have selected to 
evaluate which approach is best for addressing safety issues on both large and small scale 
wildfire incidents. To project outcomes, I will consider questions such as: How would the 
alternative of a proactive approach be useful for addressing policies intended to comprehensively 
address safety issues on both large and small scale incidents? How would collecting more 
information on minor injuries occurring on small scale incidents help to inform proactive 
approaches to policy production?   
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Step 6: The sixth step, “Confronting the Tradeoffs,” is used to “clarify tradeoffs between 
outcomes associated with different policy options for the sake of your audience” (Bardach, 1996, 
p. 49) and will be in reference to the possible actions that might be taken if shortcomings to 
policy are addressed compared with what is currently happening. In this investigation, it is 
suggested that safety policies related to emergency medical response and created in a reactive 
manner are not universally applicable to both large and small scale wildfire incidents, leaving 
firefighters particularly vulnerable to medical emergencies on small, remote fires. If these 
shortcomings were addressed in a proactive way, at least three responses could be reasonably 
expected; expand the number of privately contracted Emergency Medical Providers on smaller 
fires, begin training federal firefighters as Emergency Medical Providers, or increase the amount 
of first aid training to more accurately reflect issues firefighters may encounter in the field. Each 
of these options may result if the alternatives of policy production were to be implemented. 
These aspects will be covered in the results section with a cross-comparison of the tradeoffs 
between implementing one of these three possibilities versus leaving things the way they are. 
Step’s 7 & 8 – The last two steps, “Decide” and “Tell your story,” will be covered in more detail 
in the Results and Discussion Chapters. In the step where I “Decide,” I will consider what 
actions would most reasonably be taken based on the results of my analysis. Finally, in the step 
labeled “Tell your Story,” Bardach says “after redefining your problem, reconceptualizing your 
alternatives, reconsidering your criteria, reassessing your projections, and reevaluating the 
tradeoffs – you are ready to tell your story” (Bardach, 1996, p. 57). For these steps, I will 
consider the entire process and present my findings and suggestions for alternative courses of 




Section 4.4 – Positionality and Reflexivity 
Similar to other geographers conducting qualitative analysis, I will reflexively consider 
my relationship to the research and how my disposition may shape my perspectives (Johnson and 
Madge, 2016; Louis, 2016). According to Johnson and Madge, self-reflexivity involves 
confronting my own perspectives in relation to the project. My research has particular 
importance to me because I spent five years working as a Forest Service firefighter. During my 
service, I worked on the Black Hills National Forest for the Hell Canyon Ranger District, where I 
worked on nearly 100 wildfire incidents in eight different states. I was involved in multiple 
incidents in which medical emergencies occurred, making this a particularly personal topic for 
me. Because of my positionality, I willingly admit that my research is subjectively advocating 
for better emergency medical policy for federal wildland firefighters.  
While traditional methodological approaches attempt to produce “objective” knowledge, 
the approach offered by Johnson and Madge recognizes that objectivity is impossible because all 
knowledge is socially constructed. Therefore, researchers should not privilege their own work by 
casting their results as objective when it may be used in subjective ways. Rather, we should 
admit our subjectivities and openly advocate for the improvement of conditions through our 
research, or as Louis says, “If research does not benefit the community by extending the quality 
of life for those in the community, it should not be done” (Louis, 2016, p. 131). By addressing 
subjectivities, reflexive methodological approaches attempt to bolster credibility through 
transparency while also recognizing that the same results likely could not be found 
quantitatively. Additionally, in order to avoid misleading results, it is critical that the researcher 
be transparent about underlying factors such as where research funding is coming from. In this 
case, my research project does not involve any outside funding. All research has been completed 
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independently at the University of Kansas through the Geography and Urban Planning 
Departments.  
 Through my research I am attempting to limit the marginalization of some federal 
firefighters that may not have the same access to needed safety resources as other federal 
firefighters. My hope is that this research project will empower federal wildland firefighters 
through better information that can be used to advocate for increased medical training. Louis 
states “the process of empowerment aims to undo or overcome oppression and increase 
opportunities, knowledge, skills, collective action, and choices for those groups routinely pushed 
to the margins of society. It can also disrupt further attempts to deny improvement to their 
opportunities” (Louis, 2016, p. 77). This approach is seen as a way to promote social justice for 
groups that are made institutionally vulnerable because of certain policies.  
 Though my positionality as a former firefighter may be seen as a potential bias in my 
research, this background provides some advantages that non-firefighters would not enjoy. As a 
former firefighter, I was able to gain access to people or documents that others may not have 
been able to gain access to as easily, which is referred to as “insider research” (Louis, 2016, p. 
135). When doing qualitative research, being part of the community that is being researched can 
be beneficial because it helps to build trust between the researcher and the subjects. In the 
context of this research project, my professional background did help me to gain access to 
individuals involved with policymaking and helped me to gain insight and information about this 
topic that would not have been possible otherwise. Though my positionality as a former 
firefighter may influence my perceptions and representations, it will also help me to create bonds 




Section 4.5 – Limitations 
 There are several limitations regarding the approach of this project that must be 
discussed. Firstly, my project is limited in terms of the scope of the study. The topic of firefighter 
safety is rather broad, yet my project focuses specifically on emergency medical response. As a 
result, it may be possible to critique this study because it does not consider other aspects of 
firefighter safety. Additionally, the methodological approach of policy analysis is only one of 
many ways this study could have been conducted. Because this investigation did not utilize 
qualitative approaches such as interviews or surveys, there is no direct representation of the 
perspectives of affected individuals which may have bolstered the conclusions of this study. It 
also may have been possible to quantitatively approach this study by attempting to obtain 
missing statistics and create empirical findings, however this process would likely be unrealistic 
given the extreme disaggregation of certain types of safety statistics.  
 The sample size of case studies used might also be considered a limitation. I selected four 
primary historical case studies that are representative of beginning, middle, and contemporary 
periods of firefighter safety policy, but it would have been possible to select more or different 
cases. With that in mind, the cases selected were chosen because they are well documented 
iconic events that were undeniably influential. Because these cases are representative of different 
eras, I decided that the addition of more examples would only introduce more complexities 
without improving the methodological approach. Additionally, the study is limited in that it only 
considers cases that were worst-case-scenario tragedies occurring on large fires – however this 
was done because each example represents an iconic focusing event that led to major changes in 
safety policy. While this study has a focus on document analysis from statistics generated by the 
NWCG, the NIFC, and the LLC, there are other organizations that develop and maintain safety 
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information. With this in mind, the data sources I have selected are the largest organizations 
responsible for these tasks. Finally, though Bardach’s approach is useful within this context, 
























Chapter 5: Results and Discussion 
This Chapter answers the research question: How are reactive and proactive approaches to 
federal wildland firefighter safety policy creation produced, applied, and circulated to address 
safety issues related to emergency medical response on both large and small scale wildfires and 
at different levels of organizational management? Using Bardach’s template (1996), this chapter 
“Projects the Outcomes” of my research. I answer my research question through a comparison of 
both reactive and proactive approaches to policy change as were discussed in my Research 
Context and Methodology Chapters. I will analyze these two approaches using the three criteria I 
established based on Science and Technology Studies to investigate which incident scales these 
approaches are most applicable to, and which organizational scales utilize either reactive or 





Section 5.1 will discuss the production, application, and circulation of reactive policy 
approaches over time that have traditionally characterized the way major safety policy changes 
have come about for all federal fire agencies. These events include the Fires of 1910, the Mann 
Gulch Fire of 1949, the South Canyon Fire of 1994, and the Eagle Fire of 2008. The first three 
examples help to show how safety policy has reactively evolved over time in response to fire 
related hazards. For the last example, the Eagle Fire, I will show how the traditional reactive 
approach to creating safety policy is less effective when considering emergency medical 
response for federal firefighters, which is different than the fire related hazards considered in the 
first three examples. After discussing this evolution, Section 5.2 will utilize insights from the 
STS section of Chapter 2 to show what types of knowledge about firefighter safety “count” when 
creating policies, and what types of knowledge are not considered but might be useful to know to 
inform more comprehensive policies. 
In Section 5.3, the reactive approach will be juxtaposed with a proactive approach to 
safety policy creation where two recent policies to medical change at agency levels will be 
evaluated using the same criteria of production, application, and circulation. These policies will 
include Forest Service Region 4 6725 Emergency Medical Services and the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs Wildland Fire First Aid Project. These approaches will be compared and evaluated to 
reveal which approach to policy production is more effective on both large and small scale 
wildfire incidents. Once these policies have been discussed, Section 5.4 will continue with 
Bardach’s 1996 process to “Confront the Tradeoffs” that were mentioned in  Chapter 4 – expand 
contracted EMTs; expand EMT training to federal firefighters; provide federal firefighters more 
comprehensive first aid training – and then “Decide” which approach is best within the current 
framework of policies.  
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Finally, Section 5.5 will discuss how designations of scale, whether in reference to 
incident size or level of organizational management, can have substantive impacts on firefighters 
working at the ground level. When considering scale in relation to levels of governance ranging 
from the regional scale to the fire service scale, the reactive and proactive approaches discussed 
are applicable at different levels of organizational governance. Reactive approaches which have 
traditionally characterized the evolution of safety policy apply to all firefighters at the highest 
operational scale of the federal fire service. The proactive approaches that are discussed, 
however, happen at smaller organizational scales – the scale of the agency, or even a region 
within an individual agency. With this in mind, it is important to consider the organizational 
scales at which these policies are created, the spaces where they are enacted, and who is or is not 
covered by these respective policy approaches.  
Section 5.1 – Projecting the Outcomes of Reactive Approaches -- Political Learning at the 
Federal Fire Service Scale  
Birkland’s discussion of the policy process that often follows catastrophic events is 
similar to how federal firefighter safety policy evolves following tragic events such as a fatality 
or serious accident in the policy domain of wildfire management. In this case, a tragic incident 
that exposes firefighters to a life threatening situation can potentially serve as a “focusing event” 
if the incident is severe enough to attract significant attention from the fire community or the 
public. Social or political events that are designated as large scale are often privileged and 
regarded as a natural starting point for addressing political issues that impact society, where 
smaller scale events are considered less ideal for exposing issues. If a focusing event is large 
enough, federal fire agencies will prompt an accident investigation to look for the underlying 
factors that led up to the event, and in so doing produce new knowledge about firefighter safety. 
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If the investigation reveals any major deficiencies, investigation teams may apply this knowledge 
to a policy reform during a “window of opportunity” for policy change, and the updates circulate 
to all affected individuals at either large or small spatial scales of incident management. This 
description characterizes the reactive approach to safety policy production. 
In this section, I will discuss four historical cases that exemplify how firefighter safety 
policy is typically created and how it has evolved over time. As was stated in the Methods 
section, I will be evaluating each time period (Beginning, Middle, and Contemporary) off of 
three main criteria: 
 How was new safety knowledge produced following a tragic incident? 
 How was that knowledge applied to a specific policy? 
 How was that policy circulated over space to affected individuals? 
 
Each of these factors will be considered in the four events I will be analyzing: The Fires of 1910; 
the Mann Gulch Fire of 1949; the South Canyon Fire of 1994; the Eagle Fire of 2008. These 
criteria will be used to show how the process of safety evolved over the course of federal public 
lands management in the U.S. Since this section is focused on reactive approaches to policy 
production, the reactive approach could be considered the “dependent variable.” The 
“independent variable” for these four examples could be considered the type of accident that was 
addressed by the policy; was it addressing a hazard related to the fire itself, or was it addressing 
medical emergencies that occurred on a fire that were unrelated to the fire itself? 
Section 5.1 – A – The Fires of 1910 –The Beginning  
Production: The Forest Service was created in 1905 and narrowly survived the onslaught of 
attacks coming from private timber, mining, and railroad companies that were determined to stop 
the federal government from protecting public lands (Egan, 2009). After the Fires of 1910 
burned nearly 3 million acres of land and killed 79 firefighters in the Northwestern United States, 
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the public desire for a governmental agency that would protect the forests was solidified. 
Following this event, H.S. Graves was appointed Chief Forester of the U.S. Forest Service and 
set a new precedent for fire management when he stated: 
The first measure necessary for the successful practice of forestry is protection from 
forest fires. As long as there is any considerable risk from fire, forest owners have little 
incentive to make provision for natural reproduction, to plant trees, to make improvement 
cuttings, or to do other work looking to continued forest production.--  Protection of 
Forests from Fire, 1910, H.S. Graves  
 
The precedent set by H.S. Graves following the Fires of 1910 hugely influenced the relationship 
the Forest Service had with wildfire and would heavily shape future fire suppression policies. 
Along with several other large conflagrations and a series of heavy drought years in the early 
1930s, the Forest Service used these examples to produce new knowledge about the dangers of 
wildfire (Bradshaw and Lueck, 2012). 
Application: The Fires of 1910 did not produce a specific accident investigation; rather, during 
this time period, a series of catastrophic incidents were needed to accumulate before the infant 
agency would take comprehensive action to address the issue of fire protection. In this case, a 
history of catastrophic fires in the United States signaled the potential devastation large wildfires 
could unleash upon human settlements. The Peshtigo Fire of 1871 burned over a million acres in 
Wisconsin and killed an estimated 2000 civilians; The Fires of 1910 consumed several settler 
towns in the Bitterroot Mountains in Montana, Idaho and Washington; and in the early 1930s, a 
string of drought years led to catastrophic wildfire seasons (Bradshaw and Lueck, 2012). Though 
studies of wildfire behavior were in their infancy at the time (Egan, 2009), the collective 
historical knowledge about large fires was enough for fire managers of the time to know 
something needed to be done. Once historical knowledge about wildfire was produced, it was 
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applied to a specific policy. This was done with the “10 A.M. Policy.” The Suppression Policy of 
the U.S. Forest Service states: 
The approved protection policy on the National Forests calls for fast, energetic, and thorough 
suppression of all fires, in all locations, during possibly dangerous fire weather. When immediate 
control is not thus attained, the policy then calls for prompt calculating of the problems of the 
existing situation and probabilities of spread, and organizing to control every such fire within 
“the first work period.” Failing in this effort, the attack on each succeeding day will be planned 
and executed with the aim, without reservation, of obtaining control before 10 o’clock on the 
next morning. – The Suppression Policy of the U.S. forest Service, Fire control in the United 
States, 1939 
 
In the beginning of wildfire management, knowledge production regarding firefighting 
activities lagged behind safety issues of the time. Because the agency was relatively young and 
tasked with managing something the United States government had little experience managing 
before, organizational learning required multiple events to accumulate before any substantive 
changes would be made, exemplifying the beginning stages of political learning for this agency. 
In this case, a series of conflagrations occurred, beginning with the Fires of 1910, which 
impelled the public and Forest Service representatives to perceive fire as dangerous to human 
establishments (Bradshaw and Lueck, 2012). This fear prompted the creation of policies that 
aimed to eliminate fire from western landscapes altogether in a reactive manner that only 
followed multiple focusing events. 
Circulation: In this situation, the policy change was circulated to all fire managers over space 
via “The Suppression Policy of the United States Forest Service.” The policy change was 
specifically applied to small spatial scale fires, with the idea that smaller fires would be safer and 
easier to manage than larger fires. There is some merit to this claim as there is greater fire 
intensity on larger fires – however, many of the same safety concerns exist on both large and 
small fires such as falling trees or equipment accidents. With this in mind, the safety paradigm of 
the time emphasized that fire was a threat to humans and the only way to stop the threat was to 
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make sure fires did not burn. The 10 A.M. rule was not a formal safety policy, but because no 
formal safety policies of the time existed, the history involved with this policy directly led to 
several factors that would set a precedent for how safety policy would be created in the future. 
As time went on, focusing events such as the Fires of 1910 would similarly help to influence 
policy because they occurred on large fires with worst-case-scenario outcomes. It would take 
several decades of organizational learning before explicit safety policies were created. 
Implications of the Fires of 1910 and the 10 A.M. Policy: In the beginning, the 10 A.M. policy 
was created following the most catastrophic fire season in U.S. history and as a result helped to 
usher in a policy that explicitly addressed small fires, with the idea that suppression would 
mitigate the possibility of large fires occurring. With the dependent variable being reactive 
approaches to policy production, this example has an independent variable of fire-related 
hazards. These management techniques came as a result of several catastrophic conflagrations 
that had occurred over a period of decades, with the first formal policy lagging well behind the 
perceived issues of the time. The 10 A.M. policy was so successful over time that increasing 
numbers of people were able to build their homes in wildland-urban interface areas prone to 
wildfire (Bradshaw and Lueck, 2012). As fuels accumulated and contributed to more volatile fire 
seasons, the federal government was forced to react and address issues occurring on larger scale 
incidents; namely, safety issues faced by those who were tasked with managing the 
conflagrations.  
Section 5.1 – B – Mann Gulch Fire – Middle Time Period. 
Production: In 1949, one of the most well-known firefighter tragedies occurred on the Mann 
Gulch Fire in Montana. On August 5, a crew of smokejumpers responded to a fire that was 
growing larger and began suppression efforts. A formal accident investigation followed this 
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particular event, which led to the production of knowledge regarding the factors that were 
believed to have caused this tragedy. As indicated in the “Mann Gulch Fire” report; 
This fire was one of about ten fires on the Canyon and Helena Ranger Districts started by 
the August 4 lightning storm. Two fires, the York and the Mann Gulch reached sufficient 
size to require support from outside the local organization. Predicted fire danger was 
“low,” however, weather observations at the time of the accident indicate severe fire 
behavior potential…None of the firefighters were equipped with fire-resistant clothing 
nor fire shelters. Many of the smokejumpers had never been on a large fire. The foreman 
(initial attack incident commander) had not worked with most of the firefighters prior to 
this mission. Consequently, his abilities (although respected by his peers) was not known 
by the crew on this fire.  (Mann Gulch Fire Report, 1949, p. 1) 
 
In this case, a lack of standard protocols made coordination between firefighters and the 
foreman, most of whom did not know each other, much more difficult than it might have been 
otherwise. As a result of these human factors, organizing the crew in the face of other fire 
hazards such as fire weather conditions and topographic influences was sufficiently inhibited.  
The Mann Gulch fire was one of several fires that influenced the creation of the first 
comprehensive safety policy. According to Forest Service historical archives, “The original ten 
Standard Firefighting Orders were developed in 1957 by a task force commissioned by the 
USDA-Forest Service Chief Richard E. McArdle. The task force reviewed the records of 16 
tragedy fires that occurred from 1937 to 1956” 
(http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/safety/10_18/10_18.html, Accessed 04-01-2016). Similar to the way 
fire suppression policy was created following multiple catastrophic fires over time, the first 
major safety policy required multiple investigations to produce new knowledge which followed 
several visceral worst-case-scenario events that occurred on large fires. In this case, the Mann 
Gulch fire was the most publicized and well known of these tragedies. Though accident 
investigations of this time period were vastly different from how they are approached today, 
these investigations served to set the precedent for how they would be conducted in the future.  
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Application: The knowledge produced from 16 accident investigations, including the Mann 
Gulch fire investigation, was later applied to the “10 Standard Fire Orders & 18 Watchout 
Situations,” and still remains one of the biggest pieces of safety protocol that firefighters follow 
in order to mitigate fire related hazards. The 10 Standard Fire Orders suggested firefighters “stay 
informed on fire weather conditions,” (Standard Fire Order # 1) and to “know what the fire is 
doing at all times,” (Standard Fire Order #2), both factors that were cited in the accident 
investigation as leading up to the tragedy. Additionally, the 18 Watchout situations warned about 
hazards such as having “unburned fuel between you and the fire” (Watchout Situation #11) or 
“building fireline downhill with fire below you” (Watchout Situation #8), situations that both 
contributed to the tragedy on the Mann Gulch fire. 
 The history of catastrophic fires to this point characterized wildfire as a danger to 
firefighters, though there would be no organizational attempt at mitigating safety hazards until 
multiple worst-case-scenario accidents happened on large fires. This is similar to Brikland’s 
observation that “new facts combine with old ideas in windows of opportunity for policy 
change” (Birkland, 2006, p. 60). In other words, it didn’t matter that the hazards were known 
because nothing would be done to effectively address the issues until they became major 
problems. Once they did become major problems, the spotlight was focused on those specific 
factors and the usual avenues of policy production were followed to mitigate similar accidents in 
the future. This event followed a similar response to the way the 10 A.M. policy was created 
where the Forest Service responded to several focusing events by producing updated knowledge 
and applying it to a policy change. 
Circulation: In this case, the “10 & 18” were circulated via training exercises and official 
documents regarding the implementation of management strategies. Though fire agencies of the 
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time were well aware of the history of “threatening” conflagrations that posed a safety hazard to 
firefighters, it was necessary to establish common principles and make them known and 
available to all firefighters as a standard, rather than assume all employees have the same 
understanding of fire as a hazard. The 10 & 18 were also effective protocol updates that would 
apply to both large and small scale management because many of the same fire related hazards 
exist on both large and small scale fires. While this was an important update, part of its 
effectiveness comes as a result of being the very first, much needed formal safety policy, 
meaning that any address to safety concerns would be a welcome change. 
Implications of the Mann Gulch Fire and the 10 & 18: The policy update of the 10 & 18 came 
as a result of a reactive approach to policy production where multiple focusing events where 
firefighters were killed as a result of fire related hazards. Because small fires can turn into large 
fires, addressing fire related safety issues is likely to be applicable to both large and small fires. 
In this case, the creation of the policy lagged well behind the hazards of the time, but once 
policies were created, they helped to fill in many gaps within safety policy that applied to both 
large and small scale incidents. Once this way of knowing and understanding safety issues was 
established, the ways in which federal fire agencies used political learning to become informed 
about safety issues were largely set, placing the focus on worst-case-scenario incidents, many of 
which occurred on larger fires – thus solidifying large scale tragedies as the pre-eminent platform 
for addressing safety concerns. Because the Mann Gulch fire was a particularly iconic event 
which involved a combination of topographic factors and weather conditions that exacerbated 
fire behavior and led to the tragedy, the focus on providing safety for firefighters was mostly 
about how to avoid getting burned while still managing to fight the fire, rather than questioning 
the way fires were fought in the first place. As a result of several such tragedies, it was deemed 
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necessary to create actual safety policies so that the mission of suppressing fires could be 
maintained. Though federal agencies had identified many of the most hazardous factors involved 
in fire management, substantive materials would be needed to more effectively mitigate risks 
associated with the fire itself.  
Section 5.1 – C – South Canyon Fire – Contemporary Period. 
Production: One of the most prominent recent examples of a firefighter tragedy occurred 
following the South Canyon Fire in 1994, where 14 firefighters were killed in Colorado. Several 
factors led up to the tragedy which prompted the production of knew knowledge via the South 
Canyon Accident Investigation. Firefighters on the fire did not all have direct communication 
with those in charge, which meant that not everyone was accounted for during suppression 
operations (South Canyon Report, 1994, p. 4). Additionally, fire weather conditions were so 
extreme that the National Weather Service issued a “red flag warning” indicating the potential 
for extreme fire behavior, however this information was not made widely available to all 
firefighters on scene and was therefore not taken into consideration when planning suppression 
tactics (South Canyon Report, p. 1). On July 2, 1994, the firefighters were killed by the fire 
(South Canyon Report, p. 1). Within three hours of the event, an investigation team was on scene 
attempting to figure out what led up to the tragedy and produced new knowledge upon which 
future policies would be based.  
Different from the previous two examples, the policies that resulted following the South 
Canyon Fire came from this incident alone rather than requiring a number of incidents to occur 
before a window of opportunity for policy change opened. Contemporary safety policy follows a 
similar but more refined path than what had been established in previous eras in that new 
knowledge is produced from a single accident rather than multiple accidents, and the 
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investigation teams were basing their actions off of more established practices that had been 
developed over several decades of fire management, dating back to the creation of the Forest 
Service in 1905. 
Application: The knowledge produced by the accident investigation was then applied to 
firefighter safety equipment updates to mitigate fire related hazards. Because a lack of 
communications with firefighters on scene was cited as one of the main factors causing the 
incident, this tragedy prompted federal fire agencies to provide more radios to firefighters to help 
ensure that they had a means of communicating with their supervisors. Additionally, had 
firefighters been made aware of the severity of the weather conditions that day, they may not 
have been as aggressive in attacking the fire. As a result, federal fire agencies bolstered their 
relationship with the National Weather Service, made it standard protocol to disseminate fire 
weather conditions to all employees, and also increased the amount of fire weather training that 
was provided to firefighters. This example serves as a good baseline to show how current 
policies are created in that a single accident was formally investigated by an official team which 
led to the production of new knowledge that was applied to specific policies.  
Circulation: The equipment and weather reports firefighters needed to stay safe were circulated 
to firefighters in a more comprehensive manner that would address safety issues on both large 
and small scales. The scalar impacts of circulating necessary equipment to firefighters was 
similar to the 10 & 18 in that they were provided to help mitigate fire related safety hazards. As 
was the case with the 10 & 18, fire related hazards on both large and small fires may be 
appropriately addressed by this process of policy production because large fires started out as 
small fires and many of the same issues apply to both scales. While this event followed the same 
reactive approach as was used to create the 10 & 18, the South Canyon Fire effectively 
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streamlined the same process by using a single focusing event to spur a policy change, rather 
than multiple focusing events. Though these were welcome updates, they came well after 
problems had been established. Once again, the equipment updates to result from this tragedy 
reinforced the approach to policy creation of focusing on worst-case-scenario events that 
occurred on large fires, only this time a single incident was needed to justify reform.    
Implications of the South Canyon Fire: A policy change that spurred the provision of needed 
safety resources came from the South Canyon fire in 1994, where the lack of up-to-date weather 
reports and unestablished communications resulted in a catastrophic incident. To this point, the 
reactive model of producing new knowledge after an accident, applying it to policy, and 
circulating those policies to all firefighters was arguably useful in exposing some of the largest 
safety concerns firefighters faced on both large and small incidents. Yet it is important to note 
that the hazards addressed in the examples discussed so far were hazards related to the fire itself.  
Scalar issues are less important in relation to safety hazards that arise as a result of the 
fire itself because a fire that is small has the potential to turn into a fire that is large. If the policy 
production process uses worst-case-scenario events on large fires as a way to learn about and 
mitigate the most extreme fire related hazards, many of these mitigation procedures may be 
applicable to small fires as well. By providing the appropriate equipment and training to mitigate 
small issues that could become large issues, the reactive approach to policy production for fire 
related hazards was relatively effective. When considering safety hazards not related to the fire 
itself, namely medical emergencies, the reactive approach is not sensitive to scalar nuances 
which leave firefighters working on small scales of incident management particularly vulnerable. 
The next example will discuss the Eagle Fire, which led to an investigation that informed the 
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first comprehensive medical policy for firefighters, and was produced following the reactive 
approach to policy production. 
Section 5.1 – D – The Eagle Fire – Contemporary Period 
Production: One of the most significant recent changes to safety policy, and the only example of 
a major change to emergency medical response, came as a result of a tragic incident that 
occurred in California. Though following the same reactive approach as the previous examples 
discussed, this event was a result of a medical emergency that occurred on a fire, rather than a 
hazard caused by the fire itself. In 2008, 18 year old firefighter Andrew Palmer was starting his 
first fire season with the National Park Service and the Eagle Fire was the first incident he had 
ever been on. On July 25, one of Palmer’s crewmembers cut a tree that was beyond their felling 
qualifications that struck Andrew and broke his left femur, at which point his crewmembers 
reported to dispatch: “Man down, man down. We need help. Medical Emergency. Dozer pad. 
Broken leg. Bleeding. Drop point 72 and dozer line. Call 911. We need help” (Dutch Creek 
Accident Investigation, 2008, p. 5). It is important to note that his injury was initially identified 
as a broken leg when it was in fact a broken femur. A broken femur will almost certainly rupture 
the femoral artery and can lead to death by internal bleeding in a matter of hours if not treated 
quickly. The miscommunication over the radio regarding the severity of the injury led to a slow 
response time, and Andrew passed away in a life flight helicopter on the way to the hospital less 
than 3 hours after the tree had struck him (Dutch Creek Accident Investigation, 2008, p. 5). 
This tragedy was not taken lightly by the wildfire community. New knowledge was 
produced as a result of the Dutch Creek Serious Accident Investigation in 2008, which was the 
title of the formal investigation of the Eagle Fire. This investigation helps to further demonstrate 
how the evolution of safety policy has been refined over time, though still lagging behind many 
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of the major safety issues firefighters face. Similar to the South Canyon Fire, this accident 
investigation was based off of a single incident. The main difference between this and prior 
accident investigations is that it was based on a medical emergency, yet was still approached in 
the same way as previous investigations which considered fire related hazards. This is the only 
example of an accident investigation that led to policy changes regarding emergency medical 
response for firefighters. Though this was not the first time a firefighter had been severely 
injured or killed as a result of an injury sustained on a fire event, it took over 100 years since the 
founding of the Forest Service for fire management agencies to take any major action to address 
emergency medical response. 
Application: The safety knowledge that was produced from the investigation was then applied 
to a series of recommendations that would attempt to address medical emergencies that occurred 
on fires, rather than hazards related to the fire itself. Among the policy changes was an addition 
to the “Incident Response Pocket Guide” that all firefighters are required to carry. A checklist 
was created and included in the IRPG to provide firefighters at the scene of an accident with a 
list of the most important factors to consider that would hasten professional medical response. 
This came in the form of a checklist known as the “Emergency Medical Care Guidelines” that 











(Incident Response Pocket Guide, 2014) 
The “Emergency Medical Care Guidelines” were provided to all firefighters so they would have 
standardized communications between firefighters on scene and dispatch in the event of a 
medical emergency.  
 While this checklist is very useful for firefighters to expedite help for an injured 
firefighter, there are several requirements on this checklist that require the firefighter on scene to 
identify “Nature of Injury/Illness” and “Severity of Emergency/Transport Priority.” With this in 
mind, it is important to consider the amount of standard medical training provided to firefighters 
– as mentioned earlier, there is only a 16 hour long First Aid/CPR class provided to all federal 
firefighters. This begs the question whether that really enough training for firefighters to be able 
to answer questions from this checklist such as “Nature of Injury/Illness,” or “Severity of 
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Emergency/Transport Priority”? In the case of the Eagle Fire, which this checklist was based on, 
the amount of medical training Andrew’s crewmembers possessed may not have prepared them 
to effectively utilize this checklist, had it been available to them at the time. As was mentioned, 
Andrew’s injury was identified as a broken leg when in fact it was a broken femur. As a result, 
Andrew’s transport priority was downgraded and response to his emergency was not as fast as it 
could have been. While this checklist certainly is useful in many circumstances, it is worth little 
if employees are not provided the necessary training they need to utilize it. 
 Though not a result of the Dutch Creek Accident Investigation, another change to 
emergency medical policy inspired by the Eagle Fire were the “New Minimum Standards for 
Medical Units” issued by the NWCG in 2013. Prior to this, contracted EMTs were not legally 
allowed to work on the fireline because no qualifications existed to allow them to work on 
wildfires. This update allowed for a much needed expansion of medical resources for 
firefighters. Where the recommendations from the Dutch Creek Accident Investigation provided 
protocols to mitigate accidents before they occurred, and the emergency medical care guidelines 
served as a way to hasten response once something occurred, the “New Minimum Standards” 
actually provided trained medical personnel to help firefighters injured on the fireline. While 
these updates were welcome changes, there are problems when analyzing how effective these 
updates are at either large or small scales of wildfire management. 
Circulation: These guidelines were circulated via the Incident Response Pocket Guide (IRPG), 








(Incident Response Pocket Guide, 2014) 
The IRPG has the ABC’s of wildland fire management, covering topics from fire weather 
conditions to equipment operation. Because it is carried by all firefighters, it makes sense that the 
Emergency Medical Care Guidelines would be in this handbook. The updated protocols that 
came as a result of the Dutch Creek Accident Investigation produced new knowledge about 
firefighter safety that was applied to updated protocols and the Emergency Medical care 
Guidelines, and then circulated to all federal firefighters via the IRPG. In many ways, these 
updates were much needed and go a long way in protecting firefighters. In other ways, however, 
there are still shortcomings.  
The dissemination of this document via the IRPG was effectively done in that it was 
provided to everyone who would need it. However, this was not the only medical policy change 
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to result from the Eagle fire. In addition to this, the NWCG created the New Minimum Standards 
for Medical Units in 2013 which expanded the availability of contracted EMT’s to wildfire 
incidents. While this is a very useful and important change, it is more applicable to large scale 
wildfire incidents than small scale incidents, though technically applies to both. In the 
Background Chapter I discussed factors that are considered when designating a fire as large, 
such as: 
- Supervision for a large organization 
- Multiple operational periods to contain fire 
- Providing logistical support including the establishment and operation of a base and 
possibly camps 
- Supervisors that are qualified to manage Type 1-3 fires 
- Multiple divisions to manage different parts of a large fire, requiring multiple branches to 
be activated to address span-of-control needs 
- Operations personnel often exceed 500 per operational period and total persons on the 
incident usually exceeds 1000 
(NWCG Fireline Handbook, p. 120-121) 
Large incidents are less common and have a longer duration, they are more established 
than smaller incidents, and they require many more resources to engage the fire. When more 
resources are present and long range planning is more feasible, it is more likely for Emergency 
Medical Providers to be present. Smaller fires that happen much more frequently and cannot be 
planned for in advance have fewer firefighting resources, making it less likely for Emergency 
Medical Providers to be standing by. Though it is possible to request EMTs for small fires, it is 
less likely for them to be present because of logistical concerns, and because firefighters are 
likely to only have each other on small, remote fires, if a medical emergency occurs. As a result, 
this policy change is not universally applicable to both large and small scale wildfires, but rather 
selectively favors large fires. The example of the Eagle Fire demonstrates that policy responses 
to fire related hazards are not directly applicable to policy responses that address medical 
emergencies that occur on both large and small fires. Policy and equipment updates provided to 
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mitigate fire related hazards are applicable to both large and small scale fires because small fires 
can potentially become big fires, meaning many of the factors are the same at both scales – 
however, when considering medical emergencies, the designation of large or small scale may 
directly dictate the likelihood that contracted Emergency Medical Providers will be present.  
Implications of the Eagle Fire: As was shown in the Background Chapter, large and small scale 
wildfires are administratively designated by the incident command staff who will dictate the 
number of resources needed for a particular fire, the estimated duration of the fire, and the 
geographic extent that is impacted. The determination of large or small scale leads to a 
determination of the number of resources needed to address the incident. As a result, the 
designation of large or small can directly enable or constrain firefighter responses to fire 
management scenarios – in this case, medical emergencies.  
When considering the policy changes to come from the Eagle Fire, the aforementioned 
points are important. Though the traditional reactive approach has been reasonably effective at 
addressing fire related hazards at both large and small scales, this approach does not transfer 
when applying it to medically related hazards. In this case, the updated “Emergency Medical 
Care Guidelines” were created to streamline communications between the firefighter on scene 
and the emergency dispatcher in order to hasten the appropriate medical response. While this 
was a useful change, it is important to consider the substance of the guidelines in relation to the 
amount of medical training provided to firefighters – is a 16 hour long First Aid/CPR class really 
enough to enable firefighters to address questions such as “Nature of Injury,” or “Transport 
Priority?” In the case of the Eagle Fire, the misidentification of a broken femur directly led to a 
slowed response time.  
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Another change to medical policy that came several years after the Eagle Fire, but still 
inspired by the event, were the “New Minimum Standards for Medical Units,” which greatly 
helped to increase the number of contracted Emergency Medical Providers on wildfires. While 
this was a welcome change, the presence of contracted Emergency Medical Providers is more 
likely on large, long duration incidents that can be planned for. Additionally, the “Emergency 
Medical Care Guidelines” are arguably less useful on small scale incidents where Emergency 
Medical Providers are less likely to be present because these guidelines do nothing as far as 
actual patient care is concerned. On large fires where medical professionals may be standing by, 
more efficient communications protocol will likely help get the proper care to the affected 
individual faster – but on small fires where firefighters are more likely to be on their own and far 
from patient care, the moments saved from efficient communication may not be good enough. In 
other words, the only way to address medical emergencies that occur on small fires is by 
providing more emergency medical training to fire crews so they can provide patient care if no 
one else is around. In effect, the designation of scale has substantive political implications for 
those on the ground.  
Section 5.1 – E – Summary of Reactive Policy Production. This section has evaluated 
reactive approaches to safety policy production by considering how a focusing event produced 
new knowledge about firefighter safety which was applied to specific policies and circulated 
over space to affected individuals. Because knowledge production takes place during the 
response and recovery phases, there is limited time to learn from the focusing event, meaning 
policy updates may not be fully informed when using this knowledge. Additionally, because this 
approach requires worst-case-scenario accidents to occur, many of which happen on large scale 
fires, these scales are looked at and used as the preeminent platform for policy reform, thereby 
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missing issues on smaller scales that may not attract as much attention. When considering 
hazards related to the fire itself, this approach may be useful because many similar hazards exist 
on both large and small fires. When considering medical emergencies, however, these 
approaches do not address nuances between large and small scale fires. These insights have been 
summarized in the table below: 
Table 5.1 
 
Section 5.2 – Reactive Policy – What Knowledge Counts 
Accident investigations serve as one of the primary means by which federal fire 
management agencies produce knowledge about the safety hazards faced by firefighters. If 
accident investigations tend to focus on worst-case-scenario accidents that have occurred on 
large fires, how may this influence the types of hazards fire agencies are able to address with the 
information they have available to them? How might focusing on the most visceral accidents 
cause fire agencies to miss less visceral safety hazards? This section will consider how 
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knowledge about death and serious injury tend to count more when applied to policy rather than 
other, less serious safety concerns.  
Section 5.2 – A – Death and Serious Injury. As was mentioned in Chapter 4, the 
Lessons Learned Center (LLC) is an organization tasked with compiling safety data for 
firefighters. Because accident investigations tend to favor worst-case-scenario accidents 
occurring on large scales, the information generated by the LLC similarly reflects this focus. 
Many of the statistics the LLC generates come from the NWCG who are responsible for 
collecting and reporting “safety grams” that compile raw safety data for all five federal agencies. 
In order to determine what types of information they wish to collect, the NWCG created specific 
“reporting criteria” in order to establish the types of safety issues they intend to focus on. 
According to this criteria, “Safety gram data will include fatalities, entrapments, burnovers, and 
other potentially life threatening accidents and injuries” (NWCG Risk Management Committee, 
http://www.nwcg.gov/committees/risk-management-committee-rmc-safety-grams, accessed 04-
04-2016).  
In other words, the reporting criteria that dictate much of the information that is tracked 
by the NWCG selectively favors “potentially life threatening” safety hazards. These reporting 
criteria have helped to establish a precedent for creating knowledge about safety hazards that are 
only worst-case-scenario, many of which occur on large fires. In fact, there is virtually no 
statistical tracking of minor injuries at the federal level. Minor injuries such as slips, trips, falls, 
bug bites, sprained ankles, or mild heat disorders that may be uncomfortable but not life 
threatening are not presently tracked by federal agencies for the purpose of understanding these 
types of hazards. Though these types of issues may not excite policy makers in the way a visceral 
focusing event might, there types of medical issues are much more common and are the type of 
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thing that might be easily treated in the field by a firefighter with some amount of advanced 
medical training. With that in mind, there is a single study that investigates injury rates for 
firefighters, however it was not produced by federal land management agencies. 
Section 5.2 – B –Minor Injuries. In 2010, Britton published Risk Factors for Injury 
among Federal Wildland Firefighters in the U.S. (Britton, 2010). As an epidemiologist, she 
attempted to investigate rates of minor injuries on wildfire incidents. In her study, injuries were 
defined as “slips, trips, and falls,” and selectively looked for these types of incidents. Her study 
revealed that there are a substantial amount of injuries reported daily on large Type 1-3 wildfire 
incidents, with an average for 13.2 per 10,000 worker days reported – which was approximately 
12-14 injures reported daily in the U.S. in the period of 2003-2007 (Britton, 2010). Even more 
interesting, Britton found that there were far fewer injuries reported on the largest Type 1 fires 
(3.61 per 10,000 worker days, ~3-4 injuries reported daily) as compared to Type 2 (11.69 per 
10,000 worker days, ~11-13 injuries reported daily) and Type 3 incidents (15.15 per 10,000 
worker days, ~15-16 injuries reported daily) (Britton, 2010). These results are noteworthy 
because they demonstrate not only that minor accidents occur much more frequently than worst-
case-scenario accidents, but that there are more accidents on smaller Type 3 incidents as 
compared with larger Type 1 incidents. It is speculated by Britton that large fires produce fewer 
injuries because there is more planning and infrastructure in place to deal with any issues that 
arise, and because firefighters receive more informed briefings and may be provided with more 
equipment to deal with the larger, more established incidents (Britton, 2010). 
While Britton’s insights are extremely useful considering the dearth of statistical data on 
injury rates, her results are far from complete. With that in mind, the information she did provide 
helps to highlight where the largest shortcomings exist in terms of our knowledge about safety 
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hazards. For her study, she was limited to looking at injury rates on only large Type 1-3 wildfire 
incidents, and because there is no formal tracking of injury data, she had to utilize workman’s 
compensation claims filed from 2003-2007 to establish a basis for injury rates at these scales 
(Britton, 2010). It is important to note that workman’s compensation claims are filed to provide 
for treatment of an injured employee – they are not used by the federal government to track 
safety statistics. Furthermore, she had to acquire these statistics through the respective 
Department of the Interior and United States Department of Agriculture workman’s 
compensation filing systems, which are different for the two agencies (Britton, 2010). The DOI 
uses the Safety Management and Information System (SMIS) to track workman’s compensation 
claims, while the USDA uses the Safety and Health Information Portal System (SHIPS). As a 
result of this sampling mechanism, this study is only able to comment on the types of 
information found from available workman’s compensation claims, thus limiting the breadth of 
information that could be gathered in this manner. 
Finally, the process of acquiring these statistics also revealed that neither of these 
agencies require the tracking of workman’s compensation claims for smaller Type 4-5 incidents. 
This is because large fires are managed through a central “Incident Command Post” where all 
paperwork, including workman’s compensation claims, are filed when they occur on large 
incidents. Smaller Type 4-5 incidents, on the other hand, are usually handled locally by the duty 
station responsible for their own employees. As a result, there is virtually no way to use 
workman’s compensation claims to track injuries on smaller Type 4-5 fires. If the criteria used 
by federal fire agencies to collect safety statistics selectively look for life threatening hazards, 
what types of knowledge about non-life threatening hazards might we be missing? How might an 
understanding of less serious (but likely more common) safety hazards such as minor injuries 
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change the way safety is viewed? Would more medical training for firefighters give them the 
knowledge to address these small issues before they turn into large issues? While efforts to 
account for safety at the federal level are highly skewed towards certain incident types, examples 
exist within agencies that are more proactive when attempting to address shortcomings in safety 
policy. 
Section 5.3 – Projecting the Outcomes of Proactive Approaches – Social Learning at 
Agency and Regional Scales  
 The previous section discussed how a reactive approach to policy production has 
characterized the evolution of firefighter safety policy and how safety statistics that favor death 
and serious injury tend to “count” more when characterizing and addressing firefighter safety 
issues. In this Section I will use the same criteria of production, application, and circulation to 
assess the effectiveness of proactive approaches to policy production at both large and small 
scales of wildfire incident management. Though the Dutch Creek Accident Investigation was the 
first major medical policy change to occur for federal firefighters, there were still critical 
shortcomings – mainly related to the amount of standardized medical training provided to 
firefighters. The policy updates that came from the Eagle Fire were done comprehensively at the 
federal level and follow the traditional reactive approach to policy production, but other 
examples exist within individual agencies that take a proactive approach to policy production by 
instituting social learning. These two examples include the Forest Service Region 4 – Emergency 
Medical Services Guidelines, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs – Wildland Fire First Aid Project, 
and are discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
Section 5.3 – A – Forest Service Region 4 – 6725 Emergency Medical Services. 
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Production: In 2010, the Forest Service created a new risk management tool known as  “Agency 
Safety Learning Journeys” which were intended to proactively seek the input of Forest Service 
employees through conversations about safety in the workplace (http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/human-
factors/projects/learning-journeys/, Accessed 04/01/2016). As part of these safety journeys, 
Forest Service employees throughout the country were required to go to workshops and discuss 
safety concerns with other Forest Service employees. While these initiatives were required for 
the entire Forest Service, the outcomes of safety learning were applied differently within 
different regions of the Forest Service.  
In this example, Forest Service Region 4, which includes Nevada, Utah, most of Idaho, 
and a portion of Western Wyoming, safety journeys were used as a risk management tool to 
address hazards faced by firefighters when attempting to provide care to a patient on the fireline 
(Forest Service Manual –  Intermountain Region 4, p. 3). The safety journeys were useful in 
producing new knowledge in a proactive way in that the safety journeys helped to elicit 
authoritative knowledge about safety concerns among those involved with fire management. 
Rather than requiring a focusing event to justify the investigation of a safety concern, the 
approach of asking groups of affected individuals proved to be a useful means of producing new 
knowledge about emergency medical response for wildland firefighters. Though this policy 
update was not universal throughout the entire Forest Service, Region 4 was able to utilize this 
knowledge and apply it to updated policies. 
Application: Each agency, though through different means, establishes that all field going 
employees must receive the 16 hour long First Aid/CPR class. The Forest Service does this 
through the Forest Service Health and Safety Code Handbook, 6709.11. While this is the 
standard that is set for the entire Forest Service, Region 4 has gone considerably farther by 
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including more comprehensive language that allows for the hiring of Emergency Medical 
Providers by applying knowledge from the safety journeys to Region 4 safety policy. They are 
clearly setting a much higher standard within the document when it is stated that the update: 
Removes language that requires units adhere to individual state policies or rules with 
regards to using employees that serve as Emergency Medical Providers. Assures 
employees that state rules regarding requirements for employees to be licensed or 
certified in their particular state do not apply to Forest Service employees in performance 
of Forest Service duties. 
 
The document continues on by saying: 
 
The key component to all of these levels of “Emergency Medical Provider” is that the 
employee is designated as an EMP in the Unit’s Emergency Medical Response Plan and 
that the employee is current with regards to certification (or licensure) at the listed level 
of qualification.  All qualified Emergency Medical Providers will meet these two 
standards. 
 
In other words, the jurisdictional issues related to emergency medical qualifications that are 
issued on a state by state basis have effectively been bypassed through this policy. As a result, 
this policy allows for Region 4 firefighters to hire and train fully qualified Emergency Medical 
Providers within the state of NV, UT, ID and WY. 
Circulation: This regionally based effort is able to go farther than the federal government as a 
whole because Region 4 employees have independently laid the groundwork to form 
partnerships with state and local medical directors who are willing to sponsor their emergency 
medical personnel. Though other regions could potentially do this, it is uncharted territory that is 
not supported at the federal level through policy or through budgeting. The only way this is 
currently possible is to establish an individual medical director for each state – in other words, if 
they do not have a medical director specific to that state, they cannot legally operate as 
Emergency Medical Providers, but if a medical director has been established for multiple states, 
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this language allows for Forest Service Emergency Medical Providers to legally practice in 
multiple states as a result of 6725 Emergency Medical Services.  
Though this appears to be a massive improvement to emergency medical policy from the 
outset, it is in its infancy and is far from representing the norm. Because this is a regionally led 
effort and not sponsored by the federal government, individuals within the region must make this 
initiative a priority over other things that also need attention. Just because this region has gone 
significantly further in providing costly medical training does not mean they will see a larger 
budget to account for these initiatives. As a result, they must work within a limited budget in 
order to make the most of what they can. While the language in 6725 Emergency Medical 
Services does legally allow Forest Service Region 4 to provide more medical training, they do 
not have the financial resources to expand the program. Additionally, Forest Service Region 4 
employees that possess these advanced qualifications are only legally allowed to assist other 
Forest Service employees, but not other federal firefighters working for different agencies, even 
if they are on the same fire. 
Section 5.3 – B – Bureau of Indian Affairs Wildland Fire First Aid Project. 
Production: In this case, the production of new knowledge about firefighter safety was done 
proactively, though it differs from the approach that was used by Forest Service Region 4 
through the use of “Safety Journeys.” In this situation, experienced individuals within the agency 
realized that their firefighting staff required more medical training for their employees to 
successfully accomplish their jobs. As a result, a new program was initiated with a multi-year 
testing phase to assess the overall effectiveness of the policy. According to the BIA Wildland 
Fire First Aid Project initiative: 
During wildland fire incidents, there are two medical support needs Indian Country needs to 
provide to firefighters. The first is to have emergency medical systems (EMS) responders 
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provide initial care, and if necessary, to safely transport patients to facilities where definitive 
care can be given. The second is to provide Indian Country employees adequate first aid 




When considering the reactive approach that has traditionally characterized the production of 
firefighter safety policy, new knowledge is produced following a focusing event and applied to a 
policy update. In this case, those steps were reversed – there was a basic understanding that BIA 
firefighters were not provided with substantial medical training which helped to inform the 
creation of the BIA “Wildland Fire First Aid Project.” The goal is to assess the impacts of 
implementing this policy over a multi-year time period to evaluate the effects this policy will 
have. As a result, the production of new knowledge is coming after the policy was created which 
can later be used to tweak the policy, exemplifying characteristics of social learning. 
Application: Instead of waiting for an event to spur the creation of updated safety knowledge 
which could then be applied to policy, the BIA created the policy first, which can then be 
updated as new knowledge regarding that policy is attained. This came in the form of the 
“Wildland Fire First Aid Project” which provides training to be certified as a “Wilderness First 
Responder.” Where the current federal standard of First Aid/CPR training is only a 16 hour long 
class, the Wilderness First Responder is an 80 hour class that trains firefighters about situations 
they may reasonably encounter in the field. According to the initiative;  
The focus of this training is to provide wildland firefighters with the skills to help them 
manage complex logistical medical transports, respond to prolonged patient care, mitigate 
extreme environmental conditions, identify and use improvised equipment and how to 
interface with local EMS responders. 
http://www.indianaffairs.gov/nifc/safety/firstresponder/index.htm(Accessed 04/01/2016) 
 
The regular First Responder class has several hours dedicated to infant CPR, something that may 
be useful to know but is unlikely for wildland firefighters to deal with out on the line. 
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Contrastingly, the Wilderness First Responder course trains people how to identify broken bones, 
how to give emergency care to an individual, and potentially how to transport them to a place 
where more medical help can be accessed. These training periodss often involve teaching 
individuals how to make use of the things around them in the event of an emergency, such as 
how to create an immobilizing splint from a hand tool or stick. This training covers many things 
that firefighters would actually encounter in the field. 
Circulation: The Wilderness First Responder training is not considered advanced medical 
training which means that those possessing the Wilderness First Responder training cannot be 
held legally accountable like an advanced Emergency Medical Provider. In many ways, this is 
advantageous to federal fire agencies, which is part of the reason why the BIA has adopted this 
approach. The Wilderness First Responder training is legally viewed the same as the First 
Aid/CPR training – it is not advanced enough that it requires medical direction. According to the 
initiative;  
It does not replace State licensed EMS personnel who respond to Wildland fires; nor 
create a “responder” Wilderness Medical qualification, which is not recognized within 




Because of this, it is possible for firefighters to receive training that is relevant to what they 
might encounter in the field, but they can get around many of the legal barriers that are currently 
a barrier to creating standardized medical training. Though this is not highly advanced training, it 
is considerably more than what is presently given and provides firefighters with more training to 
potentially help stabilize a patient while more advanced care is on the way. It is important to note 
that like the Forest Service Region 4 example, these updated policies only apply to firefighters 
working for that agency, meaning that firefighters could be working alongside other federal 
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firefighters on the same fire, but because of rules that are specific to individual agencies 
regarding medical policy, a medically qualified firefighter working for the BIA is not legally 
allowed to assist a firefighter working for the NPS. 
Section 5.3 – C – Summary of Proactive Approaches to Policy Production. In these 
circumstances, the proactive approach to policy production is useful in that it does not require a 
visceral focusing event to spur organizational learning. Rather, by implementing social learning 
through a proactive pursuit of knowledge about firefighter safety during the preparedness and 
mitigation phases, this approach allows for a longer window of opportunity to create and adjust 
firefighter safety policies. The proactive approach to safety policy production has been 
summarized in the table below: 
Table 5.2 
 
Section 5.4 – Confront the Tradeoffs and Decide 
As was mentioned in the Research Context Chapter, “there is substantial confusion 
surrounding the meaning of scale as size –what is also called a horizontal measure of ‘scope’ or 
‘extensiveness’ – and scale as level – a vertically imagined, ‘nested hierarchical ordering of 
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space (Howitt, 2002, 305)’” (Marston, Jones, and Woodward, 2005). In this case, scales of large 
and small are in reference to the size of a fire. Though a specific geographic cutoff point is not 
required to determine a fire as large or small, large fires generally impact a much larger area for 
a longer time – and a result, warrant the use of more firefighting resources. To this point, I have 
compared both reactive and proactive approaches to safety policy production to evaluate which 
approach does a better job of addressing safety hazards at both large and small scales of incident 
management. 
As has been stated, the reactive approach does a relatively good job at addressing hazards 
on large and small scales when applied specifically to fire related hazards, but falls short when 
applied to medical related hazards. When the reactive approach was applied to the Eagle Fire, the 
focus on worst-case-scenario accidents meant that the knowledge produced from the 
investigation could only inform issues on large fires. As a result, the corresponding policy 
updates tended to address medical response on large fires only. The proactive approach, on the 
other hand, did not focus on worst-case-scenario medical hazards occurring on large fires, so 
rather than try to think of ways to mitigate the worst accidents, the proactive approach did not 
selectively look for any specific types of accidents, which resulted in two policies that addressed 
actual patient care rather than just hastening response to a serious accident. The table below 






In Chapter 4, I discussed in Step 6 the ways to “Confront the Tradeoffs” and provided 
three possible alternatives that could be used to approach the expansion of emergency medical 
policy for federal firefighters. This included: 1) expanding the use of contracted non-federal 
Emergency Medical Providers for firefighters working on small fires; 2) providing federal 
firefighters with advanced medical training to become qualified Emergency Medical Providers; 
or 3) increasing first aid training with a more comprehensive course such as the Wilderness First 
Responder. All three of these options will be discussed in this section. 
Section 5.4 – A – Expand Contracted Emergency Medical Providers. As has been 
discussed, the “New Minimum Standards for Medical Units” helped to expand the presence of 
contracted Emergency Medical Providers on wildfire events, but this expansion applies more to 
large wildfires where long range planning can occur. Because small fires are much more frequent 
and cannot be predicted, it would likely not be practical to attempt to expand the provision of 
contracted Emergency Medical Providers to account for every small fire. In order to do so, 
agreements with individual contractors would have to be made, and more contractors would have 
to be hired to stand by on incidents where something may or may not happen at the expense of 
responding to other non-wildfire related medical calls. While the expansion of contracted 
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Emergency Medical Providers is a practical approach to addressing medical issues on large fires, 
it does much less to help firefighters working on small scale incidents. 
Section 5.4 – B – Create Agency Based Emergency Medical Providers. Of the 
examples presented, Forest Service Region 4 – 6725 Emergency Medical Services is the best 
example to reveal issues that can arise as a result of attempting to implement fully qualified 
Emergency Medical Providers. This approach would help to address the issue of emergency 
medical response on small wildfires because it provides the same advanced Emergency Medical 
Provider qualifications for firefighters as the contracted providers have, meaning firefighters 
would possess the knowledge and training to address serious medical issues, should they arise. 
Despite this seemingly massive change, this approach is not without problems. Firstly, qualified 
Emergency Medical Providers in this region must possess the correct qualifications, and more 
importantly, must be supported by Medical Directors in each state they wish to operate in. 
Because this is not a nationally based effort, creating and maintaining agreements with Medical 
Directors in various states will only continue if Region 4 employees foster those connections on 
their own.  
Additionally, it could be argued that providing firefighters with the same qualifications as 
full time contracted Emergency Medical Providers could change the firefighters “scope of duty” 
– because wildland firefighters are tasked with the specific mission of mitigating wildfires, and 
because the use of Emergency Medical Providers on fire crews is intended for other 
crewmembers and not the public at large, would providing these advanced qualifications cause 
conflictions of duty if a fire crew was responding to a wildfire at the same time an unrelated 
medical emergency occurs in the same area with a member of the public? If possessing advanced 
medical qualifications detracts from the primary mission of managing wildfire, this may not be 
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an optimal approach within the current framework of policies – though few firefighters would 
likely argue with the standard provision of fully qualified Emergency Medical Providers.  
At present, this policy it is in its infancy and is not supported at the federal level, meaning 
there is no guarantee the policy will remain in place. Just because this region has gone 
significantly further in providing costly medical training does not mean they will see a larger 
budget to account for these initiatives. As a result, they must work within a limited budget to 
make the most of what they can with what they have. While this relatively new program may not 
have all the support it needs to succeed on a wider level, this example represents social learning 
occurring within an individual agency by recognizing the need for more advanced medical 
training despite the fact that the federal government still has not caught up yet. 
Section 5.4 – C – Increase First Aid Training Requirements. Finally, the initiative led 
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs known as the Wilderness First Aid project demonstrates what 
may be the most practical option for implementing more medical training. This is because this 
particular qualification is not considered as advanced as the training required to become a legal 
Emergency Medical Provider and therefore does not require specific state based qualifications or 
a medical director, meaning this approach bypasses many of the legal and jurisdictional issues 
tied to providing fully qualified Emergency Medical Providers. As a result, the training is not 
advanced enough to significantly change firefighter “scope of duty.”  
Though this is still considered “First Aid” training, the Wilderness First Responder goes 
significantly beyond the 16 hour class that is currently provided. Where the current class briefly 
covers a wide range of potential medical issues, including a substantial portion that trains 
firefighters on infant CPR (which is highly irrelevant to the types of hazards they may face), the 
Wilderness First Responder class is an 80 hour long intensive course that familiarizes firefighters 
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with issues they may encounter in the field, such as how to identify common injuries/illness 
related to overexertion or environmental factors, as well as how to stabilize and transport patients 
when in inaccessible areas. While the addition of this training would unquestionably cost more 
than what is currently offered, it would not be nearly as costly as it would be to provide fully 
qualified Emergency Medical Providers on fire crews. Though the qualifications are not as 
advanced, they are likely enough to help firefighters effectively utilize the Emergency Medical 
Care Guidelines and to stabilize and transport a patient, either on large or small fires. 
Section 5.4 – D – Decide. In confronting the tradeoffs between the three approaches to 
addressing emergency medical response for federal firefighters, I argue here that the most 
practical approach to addressing medical emergencies for firefighters on both large and small 
scales within the current framework of firefighter safety policy would be to follow the lead the 
BIA has taken with the “Wildland Fire First Aid Project.” While this alternative represents a 
proactive approach to addressing the very real issue of medical training for federal firefighters, 
there are other things federal fire agencies could do to help inform future policies; namely, by 
considering the safety statistics that are tracked (or not tracked), and which scales those statistics 





 These are important points to consider within the context of the social construction of 
scale. The designation of wildfire incidents as large or small are determined on an individual 
basis by the incident command staff on the scene of a particular fire. The designation of large or 
small has a direct impact on the number of resources that will be available to engage an incident, 
which means the designation of scale may enable or constrain the actions incident command staff 
are able to take, based on the number of resources present. When considering the case of 
emergency medical response, policies exist that make it more likely for Emergency Medical 
Providers to be present on large fires, but this policy does much less to account for medical 
emergencies that can occur on small fires, because they are much more difficult to plan ahead 
for.  
The preference of fire agencies to focus on the most visceral accidents, many of which 
happen on large scales, may have the effect of shaping the types of policies that are created. 
Though there are specific criteria an incident must meet to be considered as “large,” there is 
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nothing natural or predetermined to make this designation a fact, because both large and small 
scales are socially constructed on an individual basis. However, once these socially constructed 
designations are made, there are substantive material impacts that affect those working within 
these scales of incident management.  
Section 5.5 – Spaces of Vulnerability 
While it is clear that a proactive approach to policy production is more sensitive to scalar 
nuances than reactive approaches, it is nonetheless important to consider the geographical 
underpinnings of the two examples of proactive medical response policies. As was mentioned in 
the Background Chapter, each of the five land management agencies have differing functions 
and as a result define space differently in that the “regions” for each agency are not the same for 
all. Though the missions of each respective agency differ from one another, they all overlap in 
regards to wildland fire management. To confront this issue these agencies have standardized 
policies through the Guidance for the Implementation of Wildland Fire Management Policy 
document, which standardizes all policy creation – with the exception of medical training policy, 
which is handled by each agency. Because agencies define space differently from one another, 
the corresponding medical policies intended to apply within those spaces will only apply to those 
respective employees. 
 In the case of the Forest Service Region 4 updates, these policies only apply within 
Region 4 – and what is more, they only apply to other Forest Service employees. That means that 
if NPS and Forest Service Region 4 firefighters respond to a fire within Region 4 and a medical 
emergency occurs with a NPS employee, the Forest Service Region 4 Emergency Medical 
Providers would not be legally allowed to assist the NPS employee. Another possible 
circumstance would occur with a Forest Service Region 4 employee working on a fire outside of 
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Region 4 – in which case, any of the policy updates to come from 6725 Emergency Medical 
Service Guidelines no longer apply. In the case of the BIA Wildland Fire First Aid Project, these 
updates similarly apply only to other BIA employees. There is no regional distinction here 
because this project was not specific to an individual BIA region, however the situation of not 
being able to assist non-BIA employees is the same. 
 With this in mind, it may be possible for federal firefighters from different agencies to be 
working alongside each other on the same fire, but because of the respective policies of their 
agencies, along with how those policies are implemented over defined spatial regions, that some 
firefighters may have more medical protection in place than other federal firefighters. In this 
way, the incongruence of medical policy among and within land management agencies creates 
spaces of vulnerability on wildfires where some firefighters are more vulnerable in the event of a 
medical emergency than others. Because these are all firefighters working for the federal 
government, and because medical response is a high priority safety issue, this circumstance 
creates a situation that is not equitable for all federal firefighters. 
 The discussion regarding the social construction of scale once again becomes useful for 
understanding this situation to address scale in reference to level, rather than size. As was 
discussed in Chapter 2, “operational scale” can refer to different levels within an organization – 
in this case, federal fire management agencies organize themselves as a cohesive group that must 
all coordinate on many fire management issues as directed in the Guidance for the 
Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, which could be said to 
characterize the largest scale of the federal fire service, where all five agencies coordinate on 
standardized procedures. Within the hierarchy, however, there are things that are not 
standardized – such as medical training and response protocol – which is generally handled at the 
115 
 
individual agency scale. The BIA Wildland Fire First Aid project is a good example of an agency 
level policy that applies to them and no other fire management agency. Within the agency, there 
is a regional scale, where still more policies maybe created that only apply within this nested 
hierarchy, such as Forest Service Region 4 6725 Emergency Medical Service Guidelines 
exemplifies. From here, scales could continue to be broken down to represent specific duty 
stations, crews, or even the scale of the body of individual firefighters, though this project does 
not consider scales smaller than the regional scale. While these scales are useful references for 
understanding how medical policies play out over space, it is important to remember that these 
scales are not natural or predetermined – rather, they are socially constructed, and because 
certain policies may only apply at certain levels of governance, the construction of organizational 
levels over space can have direct material impacts regarding where certain policies apply (or to 
whom they apply).  
Furthermore, operational scale is an important consideration in the context of reactive 
and proactive policy because these approaches are not being utilized at the same operational 
scales. In the case of the medical policies that followed the Eagle Fire, a formal accident 
investigation produced recommendations that were applied to policies which were intended for 
all federal firefighters at the scale of the fire service. The proactive policies, however, are 
happening at agency or regional scales and only apply to firefighters represented by those 
agencies or regions. As has been shown, I have determined that proactive approaches to policy 
production are more sensitive to safety hazards that occur on both large and small scale wildfire 
incidents – yet these policies do not apply to all federal firefighters. This recognition harkens 
back to the concept of “scale bending” in Chapter 2. Scale bending helps us to understand how 
“entrenched assumptions about what types of social activities fit properly at which scales are 
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being systematically challenged and upset” (Marston, Jones and Woodward, 2005). In this case, 
smaller scales of fire management governance at regional or agency scales are challenging the 
approach used to traditionally create safety policy by taking policy actions into their own hands.  
Why is it that changes are being made at smaller scales of governance that do not impact 
all firefighters? Is this because the traditional reactive approach is not working well enough, thus 
forcing smaller scales of governance to account for safety on their own? Is it that these scales of 
governance are able to operate differently in regards to safety policy creation and have 
advantages that the fire service as a whole does not? What is it that has prompted individual 
agencies to address medical response issues at this time, as opposed to other times throughout 
history? While answers to these questions can be speculated, the example of a new approach to 
policy production that is more sensitive to issues that occur on either large or small scales are 
important points to note. Though no proactive policies have been created that address the largest 
levels of the entire fire service, these examples may help to show both a need for, and a path 












Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This project has investigated my central research question: How are reactive and 
proactive approaches to federal wildland firefighter safety policy creation produced, applied, and 
circulated to address safety issues related to emergency medical response on both large and small 
scale wildfires and at different levels of organizational management? While the history of safety 
policy creation has been marked by catastrophic punctuations that led to organizational learning, 
I suggest in this project that a reactive approach to safety policy production is not ideal for 
creating the most comprehensive safety policies possible. Many of the largest safety policy 
changes to occur throughout the history of the federal fire service in the United States led to 
improved working conditions for firefighters, but these changes only came after visceral, worst-
case-scenario accidents occurred on large fires. Following this model, focusing events were used 
to spur an accident investigation where new knowledge was produced during the response and 
recovery phases of disaster management, then applied to specific policies, and circulated over 
space.  
Section 6.1 – Reactive Policy Production and Incident Size 
In the first several decades of fire management, multiple punctuations were needed to 
trigger policy changes, but over time, fire agencies responded more acutely to individual 
focusing events. This approach to policy creation was relatively effective in the earlier periods of 
federal fire management, but most of these safety polices were created to mitigate hazards 
related to the fire itself. Since small fires can turn into large fires, many of the same safety 
concerns could plausibly exist on both incident types – so by accounting for the worst outcomes, 
protocols that were developed from knowledge about a tragic incident were relatively effective at 
addressing safety concerns on both large and small fires. It is important to note, however, that 
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because reactive investigations occur during the response and recovery phases of disaster 
management, the window of opportunity for policy change is only open as long as long as policy 
makers are focused on that specific issue. 
 When the reactive approach was applied to a different type of accident, such as the 
medical emergency that occurred on the Eagle Fire, this approach was less useful. In this case, an 
accident investigation occurred shortly after the tragedy. Since this investigation was focused 
explicitly on a worst-case-scenario medical hazard that occurred on a large fire, the resulting 
knowledge was only useful for informing policy makers about other worst-case-scenario medical 
emergencies that occurred on large fires. In this case, some of the policy changes to come from 
this event focused on streamlining communications protocol during medical emergencies and 
creating qualifications to expand the use of contracted Emergency Medical Providers. Though 
these were useful and welcome policy changes that  comprehensively addressed emergency 
medical response for federal firefighters for the first time, the impacts of this policy are 
incongruent when applied to either large or small scales. 
 On small scale fires, the updated Emergency Medical Care Guidelines may indeed be 
useful for hastening the proper medical response, but if the injured firefighter is in a remote 
location far from help, the moments saved may make little difference. Additionally, small fires 
are much harder to predict than large fires which means planning ahead and prepositioning 
contracted Emergency Medical Providers is logistically infeasible. As a result, the policy updates 
that came following the Eagle Fire were useful on large scale incidents, but less useful on small 
scale incidents. Without providing actual patient care, these policy updates do not go nearly as 
far as they could, and because emergency medical protocols favor large scale incident 
management, the designation of incident size can directly enable or constrain the responses 
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incident command staff have available to them when confronting a medical emergency. The 
relationship between the reactive policy approach and incident size is shown in Figure 6.1 below: 
Figure 6.1 
 
Section 6.2 – Proactive Policy Production and Incident Size  
 Rather than waiting for a specific accident to occur to warrant the investigation of a 
safety issue, smaller scales of wildfire organizational management have proactively searched for 
ways to address the issue of emergency medical response for firefighters within their agencies, or 
regions within agencies. In this case, a specific focusing event was not needed to trigger an 
investigation – instead, the production of knowledge was done proactively during the 
preparedness and mitigation phases of disaster management, applied to policies that could be 
flexibly changed and updated over time, and circulated within the individual agencies or regions 
where they were created. Since the proactive approach triggers investigations during the 
preparedness and mitigation phases of disaster management, the window of opportunity for 
policy change is open longer because it is not dependent upon a specific, visceral focusing event. 
While I argue here that the proactive approach to policy production is much more effective at 
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addressing emergency medical response at smaller scales of incident management because they 
account for training related to patient care, it is important to note that the proactive approach to 
policy production is not occurring for all firefighters, but instead is occurring at smaller scales of 
organizational management. The relationship between proactive approaches and incident size is 
shown in Figure 6.2 below: 
Figure 6.2 
 
Section 6.3 – The Proactive Approach and Organizational Levels 
 Because the standards for medical training among the five fire agencies are incongruent, 
where some agencies or regions within agencies have gone further than others in terms of 
providing for more comprehensive medical training policies, it is possible to have firefighters 
working for the federal government on the same fire, but represented under different safety 
policies. As a result, the patchwork of approaches to addressing medical training and response 
may create spaces of vulnerabilities where some firefighters are represented by better safety 
policies than other firefighters on the same fire. This situation clearly demonstrates that not all 
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firefighters are equitably represented by the federal government when considering one of the 
most important safety factors for firefighters – emergency medical response. 
 Though the proactive approaches to policy production only apply at certain scales of 
organizational management, these examples can serve as a template for creating more equitable 
safety policies that could be applied at the scale of the fire service. Here, I argue that “scale 
bending” (Marston, Jones and Woodward, 2005) could be a useful consideration when creating 
comprehensive safety policies that would occur for all federal levels. Smaller scales of 
organizational management are not often privileged as ideal for policy reform, however 
recognizing the attempts of policy production at these levels may lead to a more proactive 
approach at the scale of the fire service. Though agency or regional level policies may deviate 
from the traditional reactive approach that has been followed at the fire service scale, it is 
important to remember that these scales are socially constructed, rather than natural or 
predetermined. Political factors may privilege the highest level organizational scales as the 
preeminent platform for policy production, but to provide the best possible safety policies for 
firefighters, these assumptions must be questioned – particularly in the face of proactive 
examples that are already occurring and would serve as a positive guide to more equitable safety 











Section 6.4 – Broader Implications of this Investigation 
 While this project is specifically in reference to the creation of safety policy for federal 
wildland firefighters, the implications of this study have broader impacts that may be useful for 
urban planners or geographers interested in employee safety policy creation within other policy 
domains prone to disaster. With global atmospheric changes occurring as a result of human 
activity, response to natural disasters may become a more common occurrence for governing 
organizations and communities’ alike throughout the United States. As Birkland showed, 
governmental policies that are created following disasters generally tend to reactively respond to 
a visceral focusing event and use these punctuations as opportunities to reform and improve 
policies and responses to similar issues in the future. My investigation is a useful extension of his 
work by applying these concepts to federal wildland firefighter safety policy, which frequently 
follows a reactive approach to safety policy production. Though outside the scope of this study, 
it may be that other fields involved with disaster response may have similar issues in regards to 
the safety of the individuals involved with managing these types of incidents, such as agencies or 
institutions that respond to hurricanes, earthquakes, or other natural disasters. As natural and 
human induced disasters occur, individuals responding to disaster events will be confronted with 
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more safety concerns. In this way, these insights may be useful for policy makers considering 
how to address the safety of employees working in fields related to disaster management. 
 Aside from the usefulness of this project in reference to disaster management, this 
investigation also employs social theory concepts within the field of Science and Technology 
Studies to a practical problem in a way that may be useful for policy makers and practitioners. 
The process of considering how scientific knowledge was produced, then applied to a specific 
policy, and circulated over space to affected individuals helps to reveal underlying relationships 
among different actors in different places that influence the policy process. These criteria could 
be usefully applied to the deconstruction of policy issues that range well beyond firefighter 
safety policy by practicing planners or others involved in the policy making process. 
Additionally, STS can be feasibly applied to real life policy problems by helping practitioners to 
consider what knowledge is used to inform a specific policy, and conversely what knowledge is 
nonexistent. Oftentimes, policy problems are normalized and appear to have pre-established and 
direct routes to reform when in reality the characterization of an issue may be constrained if only 
considering the knowledge available to inform a policy. By considering how a characterization 
of a problem foregrounds some knowledge while simultaneously backgrounding others, it 
becomes possible to understand how knowledge creation is politicized and can influence the 
creation of policy, all insights that may be usefully employed by practicing planners or policy 
makers well outside the realm of wildland fire management. 
 Finally, this project may be useful for geographers interested in investigating the politics 
of scale in reference to other policy domains prone to disaster. In this project, I considered how 
two representations of scale – size and level – are employed by governing agencies tasked with 
managing natural disasters. Though governing agencies may require designations of scale to 
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produce a cohesive management structure, it is important to consider that these designations are 
in fact socially constructed, rather than natural. By understanding how an agency tasked with 
managing any type of disaster employs characterizations of scale in reference to either size or 
level, it becomes possible to think beyond the limited responses to policy creation that are 
constrained by the belief that organizational scales are set in stone. Geographers researching 
disaster management or the safety of government employees could employ these considerations 
in a similar manner. 
Section 6.5 – Conclusion  
 As a former Forest Service firefighter who has worked within this framework of policies, 
I am particularly passionate about the issue of emergency medical training for federal wildland 
firefighters. During my five years of service, I was fortunate enough to have excellent leadership 
that went out of their way to account for factors related to emergency medical response, but was 
aware that many other fire crews were constrained by budgets or other factors which inhibited 
the ability of their supervisors to go beyond the minimum requirements for medical training and 
response. I argue here that the proactive examples of policy production demonstrate that the most 
effective policies to address emergency medical response are not coming from the highest 
echelons of management, but within – it is the Fire Management Officers, the Engine Captains, 
the Hotshot Foreman’s and the Smokejumpers that are taking the lead on creating policies that 
help to protect their people. Rather than waiting for more accidents to happen to warrant a major 
change to the way emergency medical response is handled for federal firefighters, I believe that 
we should instead listen to those who are impacted by these policies. We have deemed wildland 
fire management as a societally important task for over 100 years. It is time we treat the safety of 
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